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PREFACE
the purpose of this monograph is to review critically 
the position taken hy the United States Navy on the problems 
of military unification and strategy that faced the Nation 
between the end of World War II in 1945 and the Korean 
Incident of 1950.
In work on this stWy, the imual tools of academic 
research have been considerably tempered, modified, and sup­
plemented by personal experience and observation. These 
additional aids, acquired during fourteen years of service in 
the arsed forces, included duty with agencies of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in 1946 and 1947, a time of crisis at this 
focal point for interservice controversy over proposals for 
unification and strategy. In addition, experience with the 
military budget at the Engineer Research and Development 
Laboratories and at Fifth Army Headquarters from 1946 to 
1950 provided an intimate knowledge of many source materials 
and events related to this subject that are still concealed 
from public view because of administrative or security re­
strictions.
The reader alone can judge whether this familiarity, 
beyond the public record of post-World War II military 
policy, has unduly influenced or preconditioned the opinions
-ill-
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and eonclusions expressed here. To some this account will 
undoubtedly appear highly personalized, brutally frank, and 
arbitrarily narrow in its selection and evaluation of signif­
icant evidence. In partial extenuation for any departure 
from the restraints imposed by scholarly tradition/, a later 
historical verdict may reveal with more abundant clarity the 
present necessity for a harshly critical examination and pre­
cise diagnosis of the factors essential to continued national 
and individual survival.
Perhaps the contemporary record presented now, with 
its shallow hindsight supported by more valid historical les­
sons, may even make this apology of an uncertain prescience 
unnecessary. Such at least was the naive hope permeating 
this work, which, unfortunately, is not apologetic, but tact­
less to an extreme. Tact, however, is not necessarily a 
virtue, if in matters of life and death it leads to a danger­
ous form of self-deception. Address instead of tact may 
sometimes be demanded and is tried here in the sincere belief 
that skill and adroitness in the management of American mili­
tary affairs are perhaps more appropriate to reality, even 
political reality, than approaching these problems from the 
point of view of what is merely fit, graceful, considerate, 
or expedient.
EDWARD 0. COOK
Missoula, Montana
August, 1952
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CHAPTER I 
YARDSTICK FOR RATAL YARDARM
. # . the dem»eratle purpose does not prosper 
when a man dies or a building oollapses or an enemy 
foree retreats. It may be hard for it to prosper 
unless these things happen, and in that lies the 
entire jastifioation for the use of fcorce at all 
as a weapon of national policy. . . ..-Ambassador 
George F, Kennan.1
Among the aliments of total power forged by the Unit­
ed States in the post-World War 11 period, military power 
has received more recopiition than in the past as a neces­
sary factor for continuing national strength. Particular 
mmphasis has been given military power in the narrow sense- 
armed force immediately usable to supplement other instru­
ments of policy in projecting the national interest on the 
world scene. Between the end of World War IX in 1945 and 
the Korean incident in 1950, this s#plem»ntal instrument of 
policy, ready a%^d force, was subjected to searching and 
continuing examination by Congress, which displayed unusual 
interest and vigor, for a postwar period, in determining the 
organisational, material, and strategic means of the military 
available to the United States.
iQeorge F. Kennan, jafr|cas D,MQata,cZ &9'Hereafter cited as Kennan.
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Re#d for a y&rAatlok. The purpose of this study is 
to review critioally the position taken by the United Btat#e 
Havy on the problems of military unification and strategy 
that were facing the armed forces and the Ration during this 
time. First, however, some relevant factors correlating the 
environment, necessity, and role for force in the present 
world will be noted as a required framework for necessary 
reference in evaluating particular aspects of force, such as 
the one being studied. The grisly implications of these fac­
tors concerning physical coercion as an instrument of policy 
apply to the Western world as a whole, as well as to the 
tfnited States, and must be understood unless specific secur­
ity problems within the West are to be appraised without 
criteria in a meaningless vacuum. Certainly, this understand* 
ing is required in considering the problems presented by tdie 
Wavy*8 position on defense between 1945 and 1950. As part 
of the scaffold needed to view more clearly this naval atti­
tude, there looms large the basic cause for amphasis by the 
United States on military power in being during the post­
war Id War II period.
The narrowing choice. In large measure, this reac­
tion to power realities facing the United States is due to 
the significant narrowing of diplomatic and military choices 
imposed on the Western world, recognised by Kennan^ as the
Zgennan, 3, 57, 74-75, 78-79, 93.
-3-
eutatanélag International development of the past fifty 
yeara* At long laat, even the Baited Statea, the strongeat 
bulwark of the Weat, haa aoknowledged that the gap of allow­
able error in aolving the problème related to aeourity la 
eloaing to a dangeroi» degree in a polarising world* Wo 
longer ean past advantages of apaee, time, and power diffu­
sion save **. . * those who hitherto had been half blind. . ,*3 
from the perijĵ la of grossly ignoring any vital element of 
power required in the real world of today. This world unfor­
tunately bears little relationship to a juristical nirvana 
where national armed forces have been multilaterally discard­
ed as a needless supplement to rule by law enforced by inter­
national police power. Realistically, the Baited States has 
chosen since 1945 to maintain ready aimed forces on a scale 
previously wi#iout parallel in American history except at 
the peak of physical conflict in the first two world wars.
Even these forces of the world wars shrink when compared to 
forces augmented by the significant multiplier of atomic 
power in the post-1945 period. Sharp as well as latent tools 
of military power have become a necessary part of contempo­
rary existence.
Criteria for coercion. Still to be determined is 
whether these sharp tools will be used by the United States 
with a surgeon** delicate skill only when the ills among
^Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour (II,
the bo4i«a politic of the world are so severe that umasslmt- 
ed treatment by other means fails to insure survival of the 
West. Although any other type of successful medication may 
be preferable, the surgery of force in necessary aid to 
otherwise failing medicine is better than certain destruc­
tion from the poison of abject appeasement. Abhorrent though 
this use of force may be, its intelligent application does 
present some hopeful aspects even in a world rapidly growing 
more capable of self-destruction. First, adequate force may 
by its own strength exclude the necessity for its active use 
and passively allow more rational elements of policy to pre­
vail in an irrational world. Second, active employment of 
force occasionally can make a great contribution, at least 
temporarily as in the Korean incident, when:
. . .  if used with forethought and circumspection 
and restraint, it may trade the lesser violence for 
the greater and impel the stream of human events 
into channels which will be more hopeful ones than 
it would otherwise have taken. . . .4
Lastly, in the holocaust of an Armageddon, force, dominant 
as a tool of policy during the battle, may still, in nominal 
victory, stalmate, or even defeat, impose conditions m»re 
favorable to reason, moderation, and stability in the world 
than voluntarily choosing bondage as a substitute for sacri­
fice.
Less hopeful, but nevertheless real, is the dilemma, 
equally perplexing to both East and West, of inadvertently
4g#nnan, #9.
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carrying force a# an instrument of policy to it# ultimate 
possible peak of total bwman destruction. Although a world­
wide cloud of radioactive cobalt dust^ might provide the 
maximum of stability in human affairs, it appears doubtful 
that any state will intentionally create such a condition. 
Fortunate, indeed, is the world that group action on a large 
scale. Inspired by an inconceivable mass psychosis, is still 
required to exterminate all life willfully. However, with 
extortion by intimidation, backed by progressively growing 
increments of coercion and force, prevalent in the present 
world, recognition must be given to the risk at any time of 
being faced with the ultimate blackmail of destruction or 
surrender. Weapons capable of this threat against America 
may soon be in place off the Pacific shore of the Halted 
States, as Brown realistically anticipated.^ The only cer­
tain means of meeting such a threat, wreover, lies not in 
the dubious, yet desirable, attempt to induce a prior settle­
ment obviating such a possibility, but in possessing and 
advertising to the world recognisable meqns of instant re­
taliation capable of carrying to any aggressor destruction 
at least equal to that threatened.
Nevertheless, negotiation for peaceful settlement 
guaranteeing coexistence should be pressed at every
^Harrison Brown, “How Big Heed a Bomb Be?" The 
American Scholar. XIX, Summer 1950, 269.
%bid.. 269-270.
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opportunity with the utnost vigor of patient, skilled diplo­
macy. Backing this diplomacy must be the will and means to 
counter successfully interspersed efforts at intimidation 
and coercion adverse to vital interests of the West* Timely 
and judicious ultimata backed by force, like the Atlantic 
Pact, may reduce the opportunities for these ventures into 
intimidation and limited use of force that offer such tempt­
ing delays for the Bast in arriving at a final decision and 
choice between settlement and risking mass destruction. Even 
then, the temptation to test these ultimata will still be 
present if doubt of the ultimate will of the West exists. 
Restrained application of force for specific limited objec­
tives may be attempted as a last resort in the hope that, 
even if the ultiemta stand up and are enforced, unrestrained 
use of atomic power will be limited fortuitously on both 
sides, as in World War II with poison gas and biological 
weapons. The chance for survival of any life in such an 
environment appears doubtful indeed. Only the hopelessness 
of the dilemma and total lack of pmfit to anyone in such a 
tenuous lease on lifs* if abundantly recognised on all sides, 
may force the millenium of profound peace with workable uni­
versal safeguards. Fortune or reason might prevail at an 
early date, but the road to the last slim hope seems long 
and tortuous, dependent as it is on the courage of the West 
to face continuously the possibility of death for all in 
preference to total surrender.
ymle##, however, the West has this stamina, any epti* 
mism is fatmems that the eontinaeâ building of absolute and 
intermediate weapons of power will oontribute to pemanant 
world stability in which the West is a partner. More likely, 
wishful escape from the sacrifices of reality will prevent 
even the maintenance of sufficient military strength, in 
being* Yet, without these weapons in hand at present, not 
even a temporary uneasy stability is possible. Thus, both 
temporary stability and th# hope for long range stability are 
dependent on the fortitude of the West within the framework 
of democratic domestic political realities, the changing 
winds of the East* s skill and error in short term tactics 
and long range strategy, while not changing the basic real­
ities of the Vest*3 unfortunate position, cause this vital 
factor of fortitude to ebb and flow like a frail reed in the 
tide of human events, not entirely uncontrolled, but of 
questionable reliability. Chily successive warning signals 
from the East have kept the stamina of the West fn»m disas­
trously ebbing beyond the point of no return. Withdrawal of 
these warning signals by the East, if possible internally 
over an appreciable period of time before a definitive set* 
tlement of outstanding East-West problems, might well be 
catastrophic to the West when the struggle is rejoined under 
the East's coMitions. To depend on toe mistakes of the 
East for continuation of the patient firmness of the West, 
backed by means, appears to be the greatest single political
a W  military weakneaa of the Meat.
fhia sombre background of the implications of force 
to the West as an element of policy has unfo&d with in* 
creasing clarity since 1945. Any study of force, general or 
specific, without reference to this background would be 
meaningless. Especially is this true in examining criti­
cally any aspect of the post-World War II defense establish­
ment of the United States, the cornerstone of the West in 
building a livable political and military balance in the 
world of today. Essential to understanding in this field is 
recognition that:
. . . Force, like peace, is not an abstraction; 
it cannot be understood or dealt with as a concept 
outside of tW given framework of puzpose and 
method. If this were better understood, there 
could be neither the sweeping moral rejection of 
international violence which bedevils so many 
Americans in times of peace m r  the helpless aban­
donment to its compulsions and inner momentum which 
characterises so many of us in times of war.7
Therefore, the framewwk of justification, purpose, and 
method for using force in the present world has been de­
scribed above solely as a necessary scaffold from which to 
hang the pacific historical problem of this study. A sober 
analysis of the following problem would indeed be futile 
except as a depressing portion of the entire melancholy 
scener
The historical problem. Between 1945 and 1950, both 
7Kennan, 90,
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the defense structure of the Baited States and the policy 
for utilising this structure were subjected to a most search­
ing and critical inquiry. Congress provided an open forum 
to hear and eaamlw divergent opinions on the form and 
adequacy of the military establishawnt. Eagerly using this 
platform, qualified professional men from all the amed 
forces forthrightly expressed their views on all aspects of 
defense posture. In 1949i the fires of controversy finally 
raged unbridled in the hearings on the B-36 heavy bomber and 
on unification and strategy. The underlying cause of these 
last public hearings was the openly revealed dissatisfaction 
of many leaders of the Bnlted States Kavy with the course 
being set by the Department of Defense in maintaining the 
armed forces. Not only were these leaders displeased with 
the implications of the Department of Defense action on the 
naval ready force, but they also saw the gravest dangers for 
the Nation present in the strategic policy being shaped by 
the limitations of available military means. If this naval 
opinion concerning serious deficiencies in strategic policy 
was correct, then the timing of the warning was peculiarly 
appropriate, coming as it did with the recognised loss of 
the Western atomic power monopoly and only a few short months
before the Korean Incident. This study will examine and 
evaluate the position on the problws of unification and 
strategy thus taken by the Navy between 1945 and 1950, with 
particular emphasis on the critical year, 1949. The frame-
»xo«*
work for using force in the present world, described earlier, 
provides a convenient template, or yardstick, for this evalu­
ation, However, in order to join the Mavy in orderly mar­
shalled array as a bellwether of defense during unrecognised 
years for decision, the record must first review some prior 
developments of the national military establishment.
0ÜAPT3R II 
PLANTING 8E5D8 Of NAVAL DISCONTENT
* . . any step that 1# not good for the Navy 1# not 
good for the Nation, --fleet Admiral Erneet J, Klngl
Compartmentalized naval force unchailenged before 
World War II. Before world War II the Navy had cherished 
and sustained the confidence of the Nation as Its primary 
force la being during time of peace. Due to the Insular 
position and essentially defensive attitude of the United 
States with respect to other major power centers, this con­
fidence was entirely warranted since only by sea could 
appreciable lend, sea, or even air forces be deployed effec­
tively against the homeland. The diffusion of power abroad. 
Including a satisfactory naval balance, gave the Navy the 
capability of shielding the Nation during any mobilization 
of Industry and the Army required for decisive major land 
operations.
An Impotent ground Army wholeheartedly conceded to 
the Navy this primary role In defense and forced the conces­
sion on the prematurely ubiquitous Army Air Corps, dreaming
^Committee on Military Affairs, United states Senate, 
Hearings on S, 84, Department of Armed forces, and 8. 1462,
6epertmën%^of MlXi tar y leburl ty, 7f übng,, r  cess., 12W»Hereafter cTted as Senate 1$45 Unification Hearings.
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of mot yet existing global range. As late as May of 1938, 
while Austria lay ravished and the peripheral disaffection 
in Ozeohoslovakia proceeded apaoe, the Deputy Chief of Staff 
of the Army reflected this official national and Army 
obliviousness to possible future change in defense concepts 
by the following brusque admonition to his logistic expert, 
correcting him for planning a long renge bomber program;
(1) our national policy contemplates preparation 
for defense, not aggression, (2) Defense of sea areas, 
other than within the coastal zone, is a function of 
the Navy, (3) The Military superiority of . . .  a s-17 
over the two or three smaller planes that could be 
procured with the same funds remains to be established, 
in view of the vulnerability, air-base limitation and 
complexity in operation of the former type. . . .  If 
the equipment to be provided for the Air Corps be that 
best adapted to carry out the specific functions 
appropriately assigned it under Joint Action . . . 
there would appear to be no need for a plane larger 
than the B-17.^
Even more rastrictively, the Secretary of War warned
the Chief of Air Corps less than three months later that his 
budget estimates for Fiscal Tear 1940 would be confined to 
twin engine and smaller types.^ Fiscal Year 1940 was to end 
with the death throes of France. Fortunately, the relent­
less march of events finally imposed not only changes in the
^ark 8. Watson, Chief of staff; Prewar Plans and 
Preparations (unnumbered vol.", £eni 'Ebierts""§reenfieII,"’el*, 
t#nlte& states Army in World War II) » 36, citing Memo, DC of s, 
Maj . 6cm— (later It. Gen.} Stanley D. Bmblck for AC of 8 0-4,
9 may 38, C of S files 17640-115.
^Loc. cit., citing Memo SW for C of AC, 29 July 38,
C of 8 files 17SÎ0-115.
-13-
#trat#*io ooaeept allowing aaeh ahortalghted military budget 
planning, tout in actual appropriations as wall. The twin 
blight# of first, a purely passive defense, and second, the 
iron curtain dividing both surface end air defense responsi­
bilities at the ocean coast, faded before bringing irrevoc­
able disaster in world war II. Nevertheless, despite these 
later developments, the Havy in July of 193d, after 140 years 
as the primary shield of the Nation, still stood unchallenged 
in that role, seven short years after, the Havy was fight­
ing for bare survival as a recognized and effective coequal 
partner in forming total balanced armed forces for the 
United statea under rational central control.
Heed for top management in applying force, without 
going into these seven hectic years of violant transition for 
the details of cause and effect that so radically changed 
American views on accepted methods of organizing and applying 
force. Nelson supplies an obvious answer as to the result 
of this periods
, . . That national defense or security has always 
been essentially a single over-all problem has been 
recognised from the beginning of our nation toy the 
designation of the President as Commander in Chief.
It is unfortunate that he has lacked in increasing 
measure, as war has become more and more complex, the 
top management facilities vital for intelligent deci- 
sions and able leadership, when defense problems were 
simple and divisible into well defined and non-over­
lapping areas and responsibilities, the Cabinet sufficed 
for counsel and the separate war and Mavy Departments 
for operations. That this is no longer true has been 
amply demonstrated by the fact that wherever there 
was prolonged fighting in world war II, air, sea, 
end ground forces have been forced toy circumstances
**14“
to operate under one commend. What ham not been
advertised is that lack of organizational cohesion 
at the top in Washington has made unity of command 
in the field more complicated and difficult. . .
Stating the need for top management facilities in the
defense establishment was easy, but satisfying that need
presented complex problems of organization, not readily
apparent because of their deceptively simple superficial
appearance.
The naval view on postwar organization of balanced 
forces. The Mavy initially stood almost alone in its belief 
that all the deep-rooted implications of a reorganized defense 
structure should be thoroughly understood before adopting a 
solution. In the face of unilateral Army plans, the naval 
leaders felt from the outset of postwar unification clamor 
that the views of the Navy were doomed to subordinate status, 
or worse, within the armed forces unless the most stringent 
safeguards for protecting the Navy became a recognized part 
of the new organizational legislation being considered by 
Congress, with one voice the Navy began its fight for sur­
vival in October of 1945 before the congress and continued 
its verbal warfare unabated until, reluctantly, the Army con­
ceded most of the Navy's limitations on overly concentrated
would work together under a mutually agreed-on unification
^Najor General otto L. Nelson, Jr., National security
and the General Staff, 586.
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plBn, passed the neeessary legislation whieh beeame lew in 
Jnly of 1947, The Navy had von & major victory by ineuring 
itself parity in policy formulation within the defense 
establishment, but the battle had been long and arduous.
The relative positions of the protagonists during this 
struggle have a direct bearing on the problem under conslder- 
ation and will be discussed in some detail.
First, examination of the Navy*s position toward 
unification legislation reveals marked consistency with its 
later stand on unification and strategy taken in 1949, when 
the naval misgivings were finally confirmed in spite of the 
legislative safeguards for the Navy and national security 
insisted upon earlier. Basically, the Navy's attitude on the 
composition of the post-world war II military establishment 
was not that of bureaucratic pride of place hesitant to fall, 
but rather of reluctance to have the Nation discard one con­
cept of compartmentalised force, demonstrably inadequate for 
modern conditions, and substitute another with equally 
demonstrable fallacies. The danger existed that placing the 
armed forces in an organizational strait jacket immediately 
after the war would freeze progressive military thought 
instead of insuring the continued evolution of the powerful
5situations of the future. The proposed establishment of a 
separate Air Force as a coequal service divorced from both
^Senate 1945 Unification Hearings, 123-124.
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Army Navy, whan aappoaeaiy Integratad mlth the 
operation of ground and eea foreee by control from above, 
oauaed the Navy particular concern because of fear that 
undue emphasis on the most powerful single eleCient of present 
day force might allow less powerful, but none the less 
essential, elements of military power to wither away. The 
historical example of Germany provided a stern warning of how 
the existing prejudices Inherent In overly centralized 
control could prevent the realization of the full potential!» 
ties of all the services.^
Above all, the Navy's proud record as the only branch 
of the armed services with long unified fighting experience 
In all pbyslcal environments, on, over, and under the sea, as 
wall as In adjacent land and air areas, entitled the Navy to 
voice expert opinion In formulating legislation for effective 
coordination of all the armed forces, only In strategic air 
operations and massive ground engagements was the Navy 
admittedly out of Its element, which it quite properly con­
ceded as an Army primary function. However, the necessity of 
separating strategic air or all combat air from the Army 
seemed an absurd division substituting widespread trlpllflca- 
tlon for the close duality of Army and Navy operations
evolved during forld war II.— The Navy's submarine forces----
ware a strategic, global weapon of tremendous striking power
6lbld.. 121
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like strategic air, yet received the necessary autonomy
within the naval establishment to develop mailmum eapa- 
7bilitiea. /my further dispersal of responsibility for the 
training, supply, and operation of proved fighting teems 
would be dangerous and wasteful to a high degree, t.ir power, 
although the dominant element of modern war, as recognized 
by the Navy's policy that any important task force must have 
a flying officer as commander or vice-commander, was still 
part of the total balanced fighting teem. Similar dominance 
of the Army by its airmen appeared to be the proper solution 
to the air problem. The Navy could recognize the possible 
desirability of a third major division of the armed forces 
only if the Army's past bungling in falling to recognize the 
potency of the air weapon had now not only alienated its own 
airman, but also put the shoe on the other foot where the
aground forces needed autonomy for self-preservation.
AS far as the hiatus between see and land operations 
was concerned, the Navy was adamant about full control of 
its Marines, both land and air, because the Navy alone could 
provide the trained teams required for full support of 
amphibious operations by integrated naval bombardment, carrier- 
based air, landing craft, and shore control parties.
scale assaults, if sufficient dispersal could face the atomic 
era, but these Army troops would still be dependent, as in
?Ibid., 390-392. 
^Ibid., 3114
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World war II, on the Navy and ita Marine Corpa for training
in the epeolalized amphibious skills developed over many 
9years.
Dominant throughout the navel testimony before 
Congress in 1945 was the reourring, theme that naval air 
forces were an integral part of the living naval organism 
and without this lifeblood the Navy perished. These air 
forces included not only oarrier-b&sed aircraft, but also 
shore-based aircraft of long range for reconnaissance at sea 
and antisubmarine warfare, Developmait, supply, and training 
of the naval air was peculiarly a function of the Navy and 
could not be farmed out to a separate Air Force, The airmen 
for the Navy also had to be naval careerists and not on detail 
from another service because one master alone must be served 
with skills requiring a dedicated life of service. The tragic 
British ezperience of wiping out naval aviation and trans­
ferring air duty at sea as a grubby, dead-end detail to the
British Royal Air Force following world war I remained as a
beacon for ell to see. In producing the beacon, Admiral 
Forrest Sherman stated:
. , . As a result, in the middle of a desperate
struggle for existence, Great Britain had to re-
organize her fighting forces to give the Navy control 
of naval aviation, and has since been engaged in the 
difficult task of attempting during & war to-modemize 
its Navy and repair the damage which nearly caused the 
loss of an empire,
9lbid.. 149-150, 
^°Ibid.. 504.
Carryina bla aptitude for miaiogy furtuar, the aavy a&vaat 
added later;
The very lateaalty of the preeent drive for the 
merger, and the destructively critical nature of many 
of the stataments recently made about the Navy, 
atremgthen the belief that the merger would make 
possible a recurrence of the conditions which led to 
the esteblisnment of the Navy Department in 1796; 
namely, that the War Department of that time had not 
maintained an adequate Mavy and a naval campaign 
was in Immediate prospect.H
Thus, in 1945, the cancelled aircraft carriar, united State*,
and unavailable moth ball carriers were already casting their
shadows before them, how useful this close air support,
fifty miles or less from the battle line, might have been in
that classic example of naval co-operation with land forces,
Korea, during the early stagos of the North Korean advance
in 1950% During tuls time the separate ^Ir Force, denied
Korean bases until later, struggled from maximum range in
Japan to reach the front lines for a few mlnutos fighter-
12bomber contact. Immortal as on expression of sound naval 
doctrine are Churchill's words of 19)6 expressed in one of 
his foresighted, but fruitless, efforts to save Britain from 
future travail:
It is impossible to resist on admiral's claim that 
he must have complete control of, end confidence la,
 ------------------------------------------------
12Mews items, Army-Mavy-Air Force journal,
15 July, 1950.
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th# alro*»ft of the battle fleet, whether used for 
reeonnsiesenoe, gun-fire, or attsok on a hostile 
fleet. These are his very eyes. Therefore the 
Admiralty view must prevail in all that is required
to seoure this result.
Integration of forse with other tools of polioy.
This, then, briefly describes the view of the Navy on its 
own speeial skills in the art of war and the necessity for 
recognizing, protesting, and further developing these skills 
as a vital part of any future overall military establishment. 
However, the Navy ease was not simply one of sonstrustive 
opposition to merger of the war and Navy Departments. It 
was rather a somprehensive and dynamic program to strengthen 
national security in all its aspects. The Navy’s program 
contrasted markedly with the wishful and false hope of the 
Army that a military Oberkommando of the armed forces in 
Washington would automatically bring greater effectiveness 
to the field forces by ignorant meddling with the vital and 
specialized problems of each of the military departments.
The greatest defect of the Army’s proposal was that it was 
purely an ill-conceived military solution and failed to 
provide adequate coordination in the top management of all 
agencies concerned with national security, secretary of the 
Navy yorrestal stated the problem clsnrly:
The immediate integration necessary is that of the 
War, Navy, and State Departments. Beyond that, however,
I wish to present to you my belief that there will be
^^fiaston 8, Churchill, The Gathering storm (I, The 
second world war), 675. Hereafter cited as The fathering 
Storm.
-21~
required to meet our problem» of the future the oreatiom 
of a meehanlem wlthlm the Govermmemt whioh will 
guarantee that thle Nation ehall be able to aet a# a 
unit In term» of its diplomaey, its military policy, 
its use of scientific knowledge, and finally, of 
course, in Its moral and political leadership of the 
world— a leadership that shall rest on moral force 14 
first and on physical force so long as we shall need it*
Consequently, the Mavy advocated that a really broad 
organisation for national security be established, as 
follows:
(1) A permanent National security Council with a 
permanent secretariat should be established as an 
integral part of our Ckivemment. It should consist 
of the President as chairman, the secretaries of state 
and the Military Departments, and the Chairman of the 
National Resources Board. The security council will 
coordinate all foreign and military policies and in 
time of war will advise the president as Commander in 
Chief, This Council will also review end determine 
the security program and budget for submission to 
Congress.
(2) There should be provided a permenent Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to consist of the Chief of staff to 
the President, the Chief of staff of the Army, the 
Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and two 
officers of the Navy, one to be a naval aviator.
Such Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish unified 
commands in peace and war and will originate the 
strategic military program. The subordinate agencies 
of the Joint Chiefs of staff should be strengthened 
and established on a permanent full-time basis.
C3) The National Security Council should be assisted 
by (a) a central research agency, and (b) a central 
Intelligence agency, both to serve all departments of 
the government.
(4) A permanent National Resources Board should 
be established to make policy decisions with respect 
to the mobilisation of material resources, productive 
capacity, and manpower. A permanent Military Munitions
^^Senate 1945 Unification Hearings, 97.
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BoaM (a joint aganoy), raportlng to th# National 
Raeouroaa Board# will ba raaponalbla for tba elimina­
tion of duplloatlona In proauramwit and supply.
{51 The Army Air forces, with particular reference 
to their strategic functions, should be autonomous. 
Whether that can be accomplished only by splitting the 
war Department and establishing a separate department,
Is a matter for Oongress to decide. A single Military 
Establishment should not be forced upon the country 
to establish autonomy for the Army Air forces.
(6 ) The Navy must be continued as an Integrated 
service not only with its oen Air forces ( including 
such shore elements as are required for design, train­
ing, reconnaissance at sea, end antisubmarine warfare) 
but also with Its Marine Corps and related amphibious 
oojiponents. This requires that the Navy Department 
continue to be represented in the Cabinet by a 
civilian secretary with direct access to the President.
This program deals with the basic elements of 
national security. It also preserves the integrity 
of each of the armed services and provides for the;
(a) onified strategical direction of the Services, 
both In Washington and in the field ; (b) effective 
coordination of procuremwt; and (c) for integration of budgets for national security,*?
The narrow view held by Army ground end air. In 
contrast with the Navy's carefully devised provision of a 
top management staff for advice on and execution of the 
security policies of the Oommander In Chief, the Army pro­
posed that the President abrogate most of his power over the 
military under the Constitution by delegating his responsi­
bilities not on a staff basis, but on a deceptively simple 
straight line command basis. The Army proposal was general 
In character and left details of organization to be settled 
by executive action rather than by legislative authority. In
. 470.
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mpite of assuremoes that aiaeentera among thoae charged with 
ooptrol of the major oompoaent* of the armed foroea eould 
still obtain a hearing from the President by going over the 
heads of their military and eivlllan superiors, there was no 
regular system provided for insuring careful consideration of 
all pertinent views before a decision was reached on military 
matters. However, the greatest deficiency was failure to 
coordinate and direct the military as a part of the total 
power of the Ration.
A comparison between the Navy’s plan and the Army’s
16plan, presented by General "Lightning foe" Collins, shows 
the vast area of difference between the two opposing concepts* 
Instead of the closely knit Presidential staff on all secur­
ity aspects provided by the National security Council and the 
National Resources Board as advocated by the Navy, the Army 
proposed only a single adviser on military matters alone, a 
civilian Secretary of the Armed forces. Although in nominal 
charge of the entire military establishment with the aid of 
other civilian assistant secretaries of the single department 
as a whole, the actual command of the armed forces was in the 
hands of the military in the person of a Chief of Staff of 
the Armed forces. The Army provided no civilian secretaries 
of the component branches to supervise their detailed opera­
tions, That was also left in the hands of military commanders* 
By contrast, the Navy retained the autonomous civilian
*^Ibid., 156-162.
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B#eretari#6 of eeeh oompoDeot. % e  Army plan usurped com- 
pletely the strategic direction of unified field oomnandm by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff developed so effectively during 
World war II by the principal military advisory and operat­
ing agency of the President. The Navy proposed to retain 
this group wil^full powers to Insure that preplanning of 
operations considered every pertinent factor, but the Army 
kept the Joint Chiefs in name only with limited powers of 
recoimendatlon. Although these recommendations of all the 
principal component commanders would be forwarded to the 
President through the secretary, the operating functions of 
the Joint Chiefs passed entirely Into the grasp of the Chief 
of Staff of the Armed Forces. The Arsgr̂ s plan provided for 
a considerable degree of autonomy for each service, yet major 
functions might be transferred between the components. The 
Navy, of course, required legislative safeguards to prevent 
such arbitrary and possible destructive action to proved 
fighting teems. Also very objectionable, In the Kavy»s view, 
was a Director of Common supply and Hospitalization, directly 
under the Armed Forces Chief of staff according to the Army's 
plan, with powers potentially capable of starving functions 
to death without more overt action, under the Navy plan, Its 
Cabinet level Secretary and equal voice in the joint staff 
agencies prevented any such sabotage by those unfamiliar with 
the special needs of sea power.
The fervor with which both the ground and air Army 
componemts advocated their cause was uaderstandable, but not
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meoessarlly In the beet Intereete of the Ketlon. With &ir 
power reoognized ae dominent by all, the Army Air Poroee felt 
that through additional autonomy within a single armed foroe# 
department their sledge hammer of power with emphasis on the 
atom would receive untrammeled development. Its advocate# 
Indicated little If any Interest In lesser nuances of power, 
and apparently failed to realize that tack and claw hammer# 
can sometime# repair structures better than a sledge hamner 
designed for destruction, on the other hand, the ground Army, 
while recognizing th# value of Its Frankenstein, but not being 
able to control it like the Navy, preferred to free the 
monster before it destroyed the foot soldier. Forrestal 
mentions the fears of both the president and the secretary of 
War:
I said that Patterson and I both had some mlsglv- 
Ittgs about the Ground Forces being extinguished by the 
efforts of the levy and the Air Forces, The president 
concurred and said what he was really afraid of was 
that we would have a repetition of the situation in 
England. In other words, the Royal Air Force movement 
with all of Its concequences. I told him that I 
thought If I were in his place I would In a week or 
ten days tell both services It was time to call a 
halt to the propaganda discussion and lobbying, and 
I said the Navy would make this stick but I didn’t 
think the Army could, particularly the Air Forces,
Re concurred and said that the Air Forces nad no 
discipline. . . . If
^^Walter Minis, ed.. The Forrestal plarlcs, 149. 
Hereafter cited as Forrestal.
CHAfTBm III 
mOGBT mOAD TO OOWmOMISE
. . . Believe entirely fresh appm&oh re­
quired* . .1 te avoid that sold, fishy look
whioh lets you be quite aware. . . that you do 
not have the kind of support from the heart that 
you need in fitting,2— Secretary of Defease 
Forrestal
laitial Presldeatlal support ÿî ASK. In spite of 
his awareness of the Army*a pressure tactics, Kerry 3. Truman, 
ColoiMil, Artillery, Organised Reserve Corps, was not the 
Bavy’s adv^ate. Hushing to reinforce the Army, which was 
sorely flailed by the Navy's telling blows, the President 
sent a maaaaga to Congress on 19 December 1945 backing the 
Army's position item for item except for four minor conces­
sions to palliate a Congress increasingly favorable to the 
Savy.3 These points were, first, the Navy would retain its
^oamittee on NSval Affairs, United States Senate,m  I* S M  M s s â  79Cong*, 2 sees., 10* Hereafter cited as Senate 194»Unifica­
tion Hearings*
^Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,
#  £• M l  MSIasSl^MSiSS Cong.,1 sees., 3o. Hereafter cited as Senate 1947 Unification 
Hearings.
3lbid.. 9-10, citing Message to Congress from the 
President. December 19. 1945. in dailv Congressional Record. 
PP, 12573-12577.
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earrler mû w»t#r»ba#$d aviation although land*haaod alroraft 
for reoonnalaaano# ware still to ha mannad by th# Air force; 
second $ the Marina Corps would still be part of the Navy 
although its functions ware dlsqulatlmgly vague; third, ad­
ditional Assistant Secretaries for each component would wai­
ter the activities of the military commands although no 
Cablwt level representation or its equivalent was possible; 
and fourth, later legislation would attempt to meet the pri­
mary problem of more effective staff assistance on all secur­
ity wtters at the Presidential sumslt. Any reassurance that 
this might have been to a Congress dedicated to the principle 
of government by law instead of men was dampened, however, by 
a suggestion that details need not be specified, but (Aould 
be left to executive order.
Congress aat Navy frustrate President ggd Army. 
Meanwhile, amid increasing cheers and support from the floor 
of Congress, the Navy had already successfully run the 
gantlet of a Senate Military Affairs Committee. Now the 
setting was to change during the 1946 session to the Senate 
Naval Affairs Committee, wearing bell-bottomed blue. Here 
the Navy found a wet welcome relief frmm the 1945 experience 
before a khaki-tainted Military Affairs Committee. The Navy 
needed only to pass the ball to the Naval Affairs Committee 
without worrying about which goal line would be crossed.
Moreover, the Senate Naval Affairs Committee was 
suffering from an understandable pique at the rather arbitrary
way im whieh th# Military Affaira Commit ta# had pr#aa#d for­
ward indapamdantly im favorable oomaideratiom of the Amy» s 
plaa for unification during the 1945 seeaion. At laat, leas 
than two weeks before reporting favorably to the Senate on a 
slightly modified version of the Army»# plan,^ Senator llbert 
Thomas, Democrat of Utah, Chairman of the Military Affairs 
Committee, in stammering embarrassment quite divorced from 
his usual professorial manner, attempted to mollify the laval 
Affairs Comaittee and its Chairman, who had dotermlnedly 
begun their own hearing on the same proposed bill. Ungram­
matically, Thomas apologised on 30 April 1946:
%  purpose, Senator Walsh— and I don*t have to 
state the purpose to you, because I have worked 
with you fmm the first day I came to Wa«6ington, 
on some of the most controversial legislation, aod 
you know the spirit in which I have undertaken all 
of my jobs, and one thing I hope I never will do 
is try to short-cut any consideration of any bill; 
and a bill of this kind should not be short-cut. ̂
The Chairman, Senator Wvid Walsh, Dewcrat of Massachusetts,
and the rest of the Senate Maval Affairs Go^ittee topk
Thomas at his word. Hot only was the proposed legislation
freed of any stigma of steam roller tactics used in promoting
it, but this liberation killed the bill completely.
From the naval point of view, the bill recommended by 
Thomas contained all the previously objectionable provisions
6.
^Senate 1946 Unification Hearings, 10.
1~9 .
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of th# Amy*# plaa, although th# fr##ld#at*« laadaquat# coa- 
cassloa# were inoluded. Squally uaattraotiT# to the Savy 
appeared the additional froatiag of giving the Aasistaat 
Seeretarie# of Army, Navy, and Air fore# the nominal title 
of full Secretary of their respective components, hut with 
no change in their ineffectual, subordinate status. Also, a 
travesty of the Navy* s top management plan for integrating 
all security matters had been added in an attempt to disarm 
naval advocates of this supreme need. The facsimile was 
excellent except that, when viewed in the lAole context of 
t W  bill, the super-Secretary of Common Defense and his mili­
tary Chief of Staff, the latter particularly, still held 
absolute rein on the military establishment. The component 
Secretaries were not even granted a place on the proposed 
Council of Common Defense, this bill*s equivalent of the 
National Security Council recommended by the Navy.
This mnstrous deviation from the jprinciples of 
sound business management needled Charles E. "Electric" Wil­
son iidio an anguished cry before the Naval Affairs Co^ittee:
. . .  I am convinced that merely starting at 
the top and combining the two departments into
one, with a concentration of administrative author­
ity in the hard pattern of military authority, at 
the cost of devaluation of the Importance and 
stature and Independent thinking of the present 
separate departments, is an invitation to inef­
ficiency, to authoritarianism, and to stultifica­
tion*
What we need is less, not more, rigidity. We 
need more flexibility in order to make the liaison 
between industry and the armed forces work. We 
need a structure that will not suppress the think­
ing of specialists down the line, but will invite
«•30»
or even oompol their thinking to oome out and be 
weighed end tested.7
Speaking apologetically of the email, billion dollar, yearly 
business of his company, General Electric, as infinitesimal 
compared to the vast, diversified activities of the defense 
establishment, Wilson added, "Rejecting central authority, 
we found we had to gc to the other route, not the one that 
according to my understanding is the route considered under 
this bill; we had to decentralise. . . The goal, as the 
Navy and its supporters had long realised, was to **. • . seek 
real unity of thought and action, not just a unification of 
organisation which does nothing in itself to reduce the num­
ber and complexities of the problems involved,"*
Presidential and Armv retreat. With growing recog­
nition of the futility of his past arbitrary intervention In
favor of the Army’s proposed unification plan, the President 
sought finally on 13 May 1946 to inspire the Army and Navy 
to reach agreement on legislation that both could support.
At this time, talking to Patterson and Forrestal, the Army 
and Navy Secretaries, the President admitted that one of the 
biggest stumbling blocks to agreement, the concept of the 
omnipotent super-Chlef of Staff in military command of all 
the finciting forces, bad been a dangerous mistake, sowing
7lbid.. 149. 
130.
-31-
%h% ###d# for a potential "man on hore#baok."10 fie request­
ed that the two Secretaries reach agreement by 31 Nay in the 
hope that a united front to Congress might allow passage of 
a unification law before the Seventy-ninth Congress ground 
to a close*
Increasing evidence had indicated that neither House 
of Congress would consider favorably the m>dified plan of 
the Army proposed by the Senate Military Affairs Committee, 
or any substitute plan, unless the services reached sub­
stantial agreement on the imrklng details in such a manner 
as to warrant the concurrent support of those Congressmen 
who shared the Navy*s misgivings. In a devastating indict­
ment of the Army plan and with argment closely parroting 
the Mavy, Senator David Walsh of Massachusetts and Repre­
sentative Carl Vinson of Georgia, Democratic Chairmen, 
respectively, of the Senate and House Maval Affairs Cornait- 
tees, presented a letter to Forrestal on 15 May for use as 
aamunition in his conferences with Patterson during which 
both men tried to meet the President* s request for a joint 
solution to the unification {problem, The recommended agenda 
of Walsh and Vinson concerning the primary points at issue 
took the position that;
With respect to the points in disagreemmot we 
are of the opinion that the Congress of the United 
States after mature study and deliberation will 
not approve:
(a) A single Department of Common Defense
i%orrestal, 160-162.
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wltii a single Secretary at Its head.
(b) The placing of a single military officer 
in sow erne command of all the armed forces.
(c) Divesting the Marine Qarpm of its im­
portant function of maintaining a fleet Marine 
Force to suppwrt fleet operations.
(d) Transferring the vital functions of 
naval aviation to the Army Air Corps or to a 
separate Air Corps.
(e) Removing from the Secretary of War and 
the Secretary of the Mavy the responsibility 
for initiating the budget of their respective 
Departments and supporting these budgets be­
fore the Congress.il
forrestal*s strengthened position mas clearly evident 
in the joint reply of the Secretaries to the President on 
31 M a y . A realistic proposal for necessary coordination
of all security matters at the highest level now included 
effective representation of each service Secretary. Re­
luctantly, but obedient to the President, Patterson had 
agreed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the highest military 
level of command in place of the single military Chief of 
Staff of the Armed Forces. Kowever, disagreement still exist* 
ed concerning the single super-Secretary and the effective­
ness of the service Secretaries as autonomous agents in 
directing their own departments under the over-all Secretary. 
The Mavy also resisted as vigorously as before the continued 
efforts of the Army and Army Air Force to aggrandise the 
vital naval functions of land-based aviation for fleet recon­
naissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of ship­
ping.
llaenate 1946 Unification Hearings, 351. 
203'"207,
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Pftttdrson also spelled out for the first time, pub- 
licallf, the Army's view on the functions of the Karine 
Corps* Although Forrestal could agree with Patterson in the 
generality of a balanced force of Marines, including sup­
porting air, for duty with the Mavy, he would not grant the 
limiting of Marine capabilities and missions only to those 
situations where sustained land fighting was not required.
The Mavy obviously required staying power for its Marines if 
limited land warfare was required to prosecute successfully 
a naval campaign. Functionally, such a situation could not 
be soundly met by tortuous liaison and ineffective coordina­
tion with the Army unless t M  magnitude of the land operation 
clearly made the naval aspects subordinate. In a#>hibi#us 
warfare, usually the most vital element of such a sea-land 
campaign, the Aimy proposed limiting the Marines to primary 
responsibility for only waterborne developments in the tac­
tics, techniques, and equipment of landing operations.
This absurd severance between sea and shore of func­
tions required to blend in smooth-flm#lng unity was an in­
vitation to dual command and responsibility for one of the 
most delicate and dangerous of all operations. Past exper­
ience had dictated that the tightest and most coordinated of 
command controls were vital for success. The contrast be­
tween Guadalcanal and Marvik was made apparent by Marine 
General Vandegrift in commenting on the disastrous effect 
on the Nation If Marine readiness were reduced:
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. . * Th® result3 of such a situation may bs 
ttx®^lifl®4 by ooosiderlng idiat would hav® be­
fallen our Nation had there been no Marine Corps 
standing in readiness in the early days of the 
recent war. . . . The operation against Guadal­
canal could not have been launched when it was, 
because there were at that time no Amy troops 
prepared to conduct amphibious assault operations.
And had we been without a vigorous and effective 
Marine Corps at the onset of the war tW United 
States would have found Itself In the hapless po­
sition of the British, who, for want of a «sail 
professional landing force, suffered a disastrous 
defeat in Norway. . . . The loyal Marines, tradi­
tional troops of the British Navy, had been 
divested of their amphibious function# and were 
engaged in duties of lesser signifi cance— such 
as operation of landing boats. By the time troops 
could be alerted for the task the fleeting op­
portunity was lost and German strength in northern 
Norway bad reached such formidable propcrticns 
that an attack was no longer practicable.13
That tragedy of grievous error, Narvik, involved what 
the United States could ill afford to do in the future—  
”. . .  putting in a substitute for a well-run team, a substi­
tute who has not trained with the team and %Ao does not know 
the signals. * . Churchill’s difficulty with the substi­
tute, General Mackesy and his Army troops, at Narvik, and 
his efforts to forge a fighting team on the spot are well 
recorded.15 However, the saddest commentary of all about 
the deficiencies of the Royal Navy while in control of com­
bined amphibious operations at Narvik, even after supreme 
command of the area %ms belatedly granted the Navy, is the
^ Ibid.. 110. 
l^lbid., 112.
^5yhe Gathering Storm. 605-610, 632-637, 651-657.
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admi##ion of th# First Lord that his *. . . naval officers, 
even when granted the fullest authority, are chary of giving 
orders to the Army about purely military matters. . . 
ïhàs defect contrasted markedly with the knowledgeable confi­
dence of Admiral Nimits and Marine General «Howling Mad"
Smith in directing Army commanders detailed to them for duty 
during World War II in the Pacific Ocean area. Still Patter­
son did not get the point and looked at the Marines as rivals 
to the Army ground forces instead of as naval specialists 
with peculiar skills necessary for the conduct of most naval 
campaigcs.
In spite of later remarks comparing Marine propaganda 
with that of Stalin, the President at this time opposed the 
injudicious conclusions about the Marines made by his Secre­
tary of War. In his effort to close the Army and Mavy ranks 
into a unified front to Congress, the President did not 
choose to leave the untenable A m y  position on the Marines 
as a wide gap for warranted Congressional attack. On 15 
dune, in his letters of wnclliation to Patterson, Forrestal, 
and the dhalrmen of the Senate Military and Maval Affairs 
Committees^ which attempted to reconcile the differences in 
the joint-reply of the Secretaries of 31 May, the President 
stood firmly with the "leather-necks” and accepted the 
Mavy*8 position verbatim on the functions and missions of
16ISiâ-, 635.
—
the Marine Corps.
Another major Presidential concession was the de­
priving of the proposed Secretary of Common Defense of powers 
and functional Assistant Secretaries in the fields of Research, 
Intelligence, Procurement, and Training because of unwarrant­
ed and unnecessary usurpation and duplication of both the 
policy guidance provided by the President» s top management 
staff agencies and the functions of internal administration 
essential to the service secretaries. In the joinKletter of 
31 Hay from the Secretaries to the President, Forrestal, al­
though opposing the ubiquitous super-Secretary, bad recognised 
the advantages of a Preaidenta&l defense deputy to lessen the
burdens of the President's far flung and excessive govern­
mental span of control. According to Forrestal, this deputy 
should have well defined powers of delegated authority from 
the President for deciding issues at the Council of Common
Defense l e v e l , A t  last, the Secretary of Common Defense
approached this concept at the military level, althou# For­
restal* s scheme achieved more rationally the recognised prin­
ciples of organisation by having this deputy mesh and coordi­
nate representatives on the Council in all security elements, 
foreign affairs, and industry, as well as the military estab­
lishment.
Only in land-based aviation did the Kavy receive no 
additional help from the President. The decision here, in
17senate 1946 Unification Hearings, 207-211.
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the Président»â words, was that:
Land-based planes for naval reconnaissance, 
antiambaariae warfare and protection of shipping 
can and should be manned by Air Force personnel. If 
the three services are to work as a team there must 
be close cooperation, with interchange of personnel 
and special training for specific duties.*?
Nevertheless, the Secretary of the Mavy was at last prepared 
to admit that the President's objectives were feasible provid# 
ing legislation properly construed these objectives. On 24 
June, acknowledging the President» s letter of 15 June, which 
had otherwise confirmed all previous concessions to naval air, 
Forrestal commented on the touchy subject of land-based air 
for sea reconnais sance:
. . .  X am glad to note that the Mavy is to 
have a continuing part in the future development 
of these operations, so that full advantage may be
taken of its experience in this field and of the 
lessons learned in the late war. . . .20
Otherwise, Forrestal*s letter completely supported the Presi­
dent's decisions. What reservations Forrestal may have had 
concerning the Air Force's ability to be the Navy's long 
range eyes were now at least protected as possible future pro­
tests. The inviolate preservation of naval integrity and 
autonomy at all levels, including the Council of Common De­
fense, allowed the Secretary the right of direct appeal to 
the President, which was nearly as effective as full Cabinet 
status. Also, Congress was standing careful guard over the 
Navy and blocking any legislative loopholes inimical to
3>9ibid.. 208.
20ibid.. 211$
naval interests.
Retreat ends ^  debacle. Following the President’s 
letters of 15 dune, idtich stated the objectives unification 
legislation should now accomplish, the Senate Maval Affairs 
Coonittee was happy to let the onerous chore of redrafting 
suitable legislation go unchallenged to a hapless Senator 
Thomas, whose bill, approved by his Military Affairs Commit- 
tee, remained on the Senate calendar, Thomas vainly attempted 
to do this the hard way by amendments to the original bill.
The resultant confusions in the text left the super-Secretary 
far more power than Forrestal intended to agree with in his 
letter of 24 dune to the President, which had supported the 
Presidential objectives. Therefore, the Mavy was forced to 
complain that the President’s intent was not fulfilled by 
the revised p r o p o s a l . 21
In g^ite of this, Thomas’s revision bore the caption,
”Printed with the amendments of the Senate carrying out the 
recommendations of the President in his letter to Senator 
Thomas of Utah of dune 15.*%2 The Naval Affairs Committee 
feared that the rug might be pulled out from under the Mavy 
by the President if he stated that this new Military Affairs 
Committee bill met the objectives with which the Navy had 
expressed agreement.23 These valiant supporters of the Navy
2^Ibid.. 215.
22lbid.. 214.
217-21S.
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held the line with forbidding mien and prevented any further 
attempt at Freeidential or Army ineuraiona until Porreatal 
welded ahut the gap he bad inadvertently left in the naval 
armor. With riveta added for good meaaure, the atacoato tone 
of Porreatal*a telegram from Bikini on 5 duly to Kenney, hia 
deputy, found its way into the hearings of the Naval Affaira 
Committee. There it proved an effective accompaniment to 
these winners of the Navy **B" for 1946 while th^ sang a 
spirited «Anchors Aweigh" in requiem over the lifeless Array 
merger bill. Porrestal*s musical note read:
X have studied amendments to Thomas bill. As 
I read them they fall completely short of correcting 
numerous basic defects of organisation originally 
proposed which was and still continues to be an ad­
ministrative ^nstrosity. Am convinced it is utterly 
impossible to incorporate directives of Presidmt * s 
plan into framwork of Thomas bill. Believe entirely 
fresh approach required. . . .  I feel strongly that 
Senate Naval Affairs Committee should be given op­
portunity for participation in development of 
legislation equal to that already M d  by Senate 
Military Affairs Committee. Please transmit this 
message to Senator Walsh and leave to his discretion 
decision as to public r e l e a s e .*4
Walsh was exceedingly discreet from the Navy*s point 
of view. Succinctly, a Congressional summary states, in 
part, «but opposition continuing, the President requested 
that the measure be d r o p p e d . " 2 $ Thus, ignominiously, the 
violent pressure tactics of the Army ground and air ended.
The next move was ?orrestal*s «fresh approach.”
24lbid.. 34Ô.
25Senate 1947 Unification Hearings, 7.
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Qrand Gomoroalaa of 1947. In setting the stage for 
the Eightieth Congress, President Trusian made every effort 
to avoid the past stigma of arbitrary exeeutive action in 
formulating unification legislation. The Navy was recognised 
as a coequal partner in every step of the process. To 
counter-balance the past dominance of the Army and Army air 
in his counsels, the President now set up in his own office 
a steering committee for drafting new legislation. This 
group could hardly be charged with Army bias because Admiral 
Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President, and Clark Clifford, 
recently transformed from naval aide to civilian assistant in 
the Executive Office, were the two principal members.2̂
Because of the need of the Presidential drafters for 
close liaison with the War ami Navy Departments, Admiral 
Sherman and General Norstad, top flight aviators and planners, 
were designated by Porreatal and Symington, Assistant Secre­
tary of War for Air, to assist at the departmental level in 
keeping everyone in mutually agreed c h a n n e l s . 27 Starting at 
Porreatal* s suggestion to Symington in early November, these 
military statesmen made phenomenal progress. By mid-December, 
a critically needed directive on unified command in seven 
potential theaters of operation was prepared, approved, and 
implemented following their recommendation to the Joint
26pOrrestal, 203-204.
27s*nate 1947 Unification Hearings, 154.
Chief# of Staff.This o#o###ary preliminary of good faith 
in assigning stratégie responsibilities and missions fostered 
rapid agreement on the broader aspects of unification. On 
16 January 1947» the wmplete concurrence of Sherman and 
Norstad on the substance of the new unification legislation 
found fruition in another joint letter of Patterson and For- 
restai to the President.29 This letter, although framed 
« . . .  within the scope and spirit, . ."30 of the President's 
decisions in June of 1946, showed far more political as well 
as military realism than the interchange of views the previous 
spring. Everything was well pinned down including, above 
all, retention by the Navy of full control of its own land- 
based aircraft for reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, 
and protection of s h i p p i n g . 3 1
The same team of Norstad and Sherman, assisted by 
the White House steering msmittee, quickly drafted a truly 
united front of recommended legislation. The President 
transmitted the proposed bill to Congress on 26 February 
1947,32 tith comparatively little sniping at a Democratic 
bill by a Republican Congress, who found faint support for 
their antics from a military at last speaking with almost
26lbid.. 7, 164.
29ibid.. 103-106, 164.
30l b M .. 103.
31lbixi.. 105.
32ibid.. 1, 164-167.
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one voice in support of the legislation, unification finally 
became law on 26 July 1947 and Forreatal was confirmed as 
Secretary of Defense the next day.33 A large measure of the 
credit for final passage must go to the Army and Army Air 
Force, who belatedly had recognised that joining the victors 
is necessary to be successful in a campaign where unassisted 
conquest is impossible. On the other band, Porreatal and the 
Navy, in proper humility, prided themselves only for a co­
operative venture preserving balanced forces as versatile 
instruments of national policy. No longer, as forrestal put 
it, did the Navy fear being forced into the disloyal position 
where :
. . . men can say, "Aye, aye, sir,* but they 
can still give you that cold, fishy look which 
lets you be quite aware of the fact that they do 
not agree with you, that you do not have the kind 
of export from the heart that you need in fight-
The new unification law resembled closely Forrestal*s 
statesmanlike vision of top level security management ex­
pressed so forcibly in 1946.35 included in the National 
Security Act of 1947 were Forrestal* s original key concepts 
of a Presidential staff, the National Security Council for
33Forrestal, 295, 297.
34senate 1947 Unification Hearings, 36.
35See Suora. pp. 3LN-22. Committee on Armed Ser­
vices, United States Senate, Hearings on S, 1269 and 1843. 
Nation^ Security Awodmnts 'p ^i9p. 81 Gong., 1 sees., 
Î3ÏÎK Tacin|^60. nSêrêâlterWeïï^as%ate 1949 Unifica­
tion Hearings.
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Integrmting dom#Btio, foreign, and military policy and the 
National Security Reaoureea Board for coordinating military, 
industrial, and civilian mobilisation. Assisting the Nation­
al Security Council was the Central Intelligence Agency as 
previously contemplated. In view of other agencies coordinat­
ing broad applications of science, Porreatal*a central re­
search agency became a Research and Development Board report­
ing to the Secretary of Defense on scientific techniques of 
military value. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, now aided by a 
statutory jola&ataff equally representing the separate ser­
vices, had been preserved intact as the principal military 
advisers to the President and to his deputy on military 
matters, the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary now reduced 
the President * s burden of excessive span of control by dele­
gated authority over the autonomous department s properly 
conveyed by law, a marked change from the 1945 Army concept 
of blanket powers over the merged services arbitrarily or­
dained by executive order. Subject to the general supervision 
of the Secretary of Defense in matters affecting the National 
Military Establishment as a whole, the Secretaries of Army, 
Navy, and Air Force bad full administrative control of 
autonomous executive departments as well as the right of 
appeal to the President concerning decisions affecting their 
departments. Their role as special advisers in their fields 
was enjoined by statute in a War Council to the Secretary of 
Defense, and above all, as representatives of their services
•44«
on the national Security Council. Although their place on 
the Presidential succession list was lost, the President was 
expected to use the Secretaries in his cabinet as needed.
The Munitions Board, as in the case of the Research and Devel* 
opment Board, reported to tim Secretary of Defense instead of 
to the National Security Council, but its functions were the 
same as Forrestal forecast, primarily coordination of procure­
ment and supply within the National Military Establishment.
Within the separate departments, the role and mission 
of the three components of the armed forces had not only been 
adequately defined in general tenm in the new statute, but 
the detailed Executive Order implementing the statute preserved 
completely the primary functions of each service that they were 
best fit by experience and tradition to perform. The view of 
the Navy had prevailed in all respects concerning the inviola­
bility of the Marine Corps and naval aviation, including the 
necessary land-based air, as essential tools of the naval 
trade.2?
Dormant seeds of naval discontent. In spite of this 
justified deference to the naval position, the deep wounds to 
the Navy, cut by the Army and Army Air Force in attempting to 
sever vital functions from an operating element with %diich 
they were grossly unfcuailiar, continued to fester. Naval
3&Senate 1947 Unification Hearings, 29
37lbid.. 3-5.
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ûonfld#nce in the judgment of Army end Air Force leaders was 
bound to suffer as a consequence, particularly at the higher 
levels where intelligent joint planning and direction were 
required in forging integrated task forces from the specialist 
units provided from all branches. By contrast, the Navy at 
no time had depreciated the role and importance of the other 
services. Instead, helpful naval suggestions had emphasised 
the necessity for autonomous strategic air forces, not as a 
panacea, but as an essential element within the framework of 
total military power with all its shades of useful applica­
tion. The Navy had also eaqpressed some misgivings about 
organisational obstacles, self-imposed within the Army, that 
might endanger the training, control, and effectiveness of 
ground-air teams by separating all combat air from the ground 
forces. However, the Navy made no protest about the final 
conclusion to transform these teams into a two-headed Hydra 
under joint control of those presumed best qualified to make 
that operational decision. Nevertheless, the Navy had chal­
lenged effectively the consistency of this unproved solution
as a justification for the aggrandisement by the Air Force of
dJrall the military'^resources of the Nation.
As has been seen, most of Forrestal*s original posi­
tion of 1945 was realized in the compromise legislation of 
1947. Concessions had be®i made only in the means of reduc­
ing to manageable proportions the President * s Span of control 
over the agencies comemed with national security. Here,
« 4 6  •
although the concept of a top Preaideatlal staff was retain­
ed for the Wiol# field of security in order to relieve the 
President of the details of planning, coordination, and 
supervision of approved policy, forrestal* s re commandât ion 
to have a Presidential deputy at this level with specific 
delegated powers of decision would have reduced the number 
of agency heads reporting to the President far more effec­
tively by unified control of a single functional area than 
by simply having such a deputy preside only over the three 
armed services. Nevertheless, the greater deputy, a Chair­
man of the National Security Council other than the President, 
was sacrificed for the lesser, a Secretary of Defense, presid­
ing over the National Military Establishment, The latter 
position would have no doubt evolved eventually in any event 
due to its theoretical logic in tidying up the cluttered 
organisational chart of the Executive Branch, but less tan­
gible obstacles, most already partially revealed by the Navy, 
hid behind the theory that prettying up the chart would 
automatically provide greater military effectiveness. Time 
alone could test the compromise of 1947.
CHAPTER IV 
T28TINQ AND TAMPERING
. . .  it is very difficult to get a correct expres­
sion from the military authorities so long as the expres­
sion is controlled politically before it is rendered.—  
General of the Army George G. Marshall*
Magnitude of unification problems, forrestal, the 
principal architect of the new National Military Establishment, 
presided over the initial crucible, a critical period of 
painful trial and error in attempting to bind together power­
ful subsidiaries into a mammoth corporation. The problwa 
essentially was to harmonise the contribution of each sub­
sidiary to the total military power in being of the Nation in 
such a manner that the sum of these contributions would 
provide the Nation, to the maximum extent possible, with more 
power than the subsidiaries had produced for comparable 
diversions of the national effort before unification.
Obviously, the solution was an art, not a science, because 
only empirical methods could provide a dubious answer due 
to the infinite intangibles involved. Cremating potential 
in atomic thermal units might be forecast accurately, but
^Committee on Armed services. House of Representatives,
Hearings. The National Defense program— Unification and strategy, 
El Gong., nTess., 6Ü4. Sereafter cited as House 1949 
Strategy Hearings.
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th# questions of targets, percentage of potential effective 
on target, and means of delivery were just a few complicating 
factors affecting even the simplest and crudest of approaches 
to evaluating military strength, furthermore, if force were 
to meet the criteria developed in Chapter I for its hopeful 
employment as a deterrent of wars and in limiting wars, short 
of mass and possibly total destruction, probably the national 
interest might best be pursued with more balanced forces than 
those merely capable of incineration. Coordination of the 
three services to obtain a more effective total military 
team with greater power, yet at the same time flexible enough 
to meet varying contingencies imposed by the changing needs 
of foreign and military policy, required a dangerously 
delicate adjustment and compromise of conflicting demands, 
Sight answers were well nigh impossible to develop with any 
d%ree of assurance, wrong answers could have fatal results 
to the Nation, forrestal*s new job, fraught with overwhelm­
ing difficulties end dangers, assumed the greatest signifi­
cance amid the narrowing choices facing the United states on 
the world scene,
futility in allotting defense deficits. These 
difficult problems facing the National Military Establishment 
had been further complicated by an arbitrary ceiling on 
defense costs imposed by the president and the Congress long 
before forrestal became Secretary of Defense, on 13 May 1946, 
the President established his policy of limiting defense
• 49-*
appropriation request# to not more then one third of the bud»
2get after meeting carrying charge# on the national debt.
AS a result, Forrestal, who had actually taken his oath of 
office on 17 September 1947 after six weeks spent organizing 
for business following his confirmation by the Senate, found 
his establishment in the fiscal year ending 30 June 1948 with 
the going rate of expenditure on the military forces already 
well established at under fifteen billion dollars annually.^ 
Congress, needless to say, particularly the usually hostile 
Eightieth, had cooperated with the President by showing even 
greater zeal than he for across-the-board economy emphasizing 
cuts in non-pork military expenditures. Appearing nearly 
oblivious to the stringent injunctions of Section 8, Article 
I, of the Constitution **• • .to raise and support armies . ,* 
end *. . . to provide and maintain a navy . . .«, powers that 
cannot be delegated, Congress joyously accepted the parochial 
view of the President as a measure of its own responsibility 
also. Perhaps the relentless march of events would demonstrate 
that the visible capabilities and intentions of other powers 
might have been a better yardstick for estimating our defense 
needs.
Even the Communist defenestration of Czechoslovakia
into the waiting clutch of the Soviet Union and the blockade 
of Berlin had little impact on the President and Congress
^Forrestal, 160. 
^Ibid.. 314, 351-353.
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in establishing better criteria for judging defense needs,
AS late as 15 October 1948» Forrestal was attempting to plan 
a budget within the President's limit of fifteen billion for 
the fiscal year that was to end one week after the Korean 
incident of 1950# The services had estimated their needs, 
within the strictest interpretations of calculated risk and 
minimum pork, at a modest figure of approximately thirty 
billion dollars. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, feeling perhaps 
that as individual military heads of their forces they had 
not been harsh enough in rending lard from their various 
arms and bureaus, had finally been pushed and goaded by a 
knife-wielding Mclarney Board, established by forrestal as 
defense management experts in men and materials, into an 
absolute minimum figure of nearly twenty-four billion. This 
annual carrying charge on insurance, so the Joint Chiefs 
thought, might keep the Ration out of war and give a reason­
able mobilization base with sufficiently secured strategic 
air and ground-heads to insure possible victory in the event 
war came. The fifteen billion dollar limitation could only 
promise the holding of the Eurasian off-shore islands end a 
limited air offensive from England while the offensive power 
of the Ravy and Army was forced to wither away in order to 
make even this capability effective. The extreme absurdity 
of the predicament that the fifteen billion dollar annual 
limit placed on the security planners of the Ration, unless 
they trusted Stalin as the reincarnated world Messiah, was 
pointed out by General aruenther, secretary of the Joint Staff,
• 51-*
whom forrestal records as saylag there was no answer to the 
dilemma unless, **. . * you are willing to gamble . . 
on an air offensive alone. Under these conditions, balanced 
forces were Impossible to aohlsTe, although the sledge hammer 
of power, the atomic, biological* and chemical air offensive, 
was a capability required as a deterrent to widespread, overt 
Soviet aggression and as a tool In unlimited war with the 
Soviet Union, the crying need was for Immediately employable 
ground forces, supported by tactical air and naval power, 
sufficient to prevent or limit soviet attempts to whittle 
away at the protective Eurasian periphery, the vital area of 
long-range decision for both hast and Weat.^
This quandary had no answer except Gruenther*s 
gamble, skeptically received even by the Air forcé, which 
found that forrestal*s views Included collateral support from 
naval air for diversionary strategic strikes to assist the 
prime mission of the Air force end make up for Its probable 
shortage of nearby bases to the primary targets. Also, the 
continuing budget support of a supercarrier, capable of 
supplementing atomic deliveries, Intruded on what the Air 
force hoped to make Its unique field.^ The Navy, la Its turn, 
took a jaundiced view of continuing Air force efforts to re­
duce It to the same supine, helpless status as the ground
*Ibid.. 374, >02-505.
*Ibid.. 466-467, 513-514.
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Ajpay, whloh bad loyally ecoapted t&at role la favor of the 
immediate retaliatory power of the Air yoree end the Navy,
euppoeedly bound together aa mutually aupportlng etriklng
7teema by the hey V.'eet end Newport egreemente.
Although forreetal made remarkable progreea In learn 
oontrovereial areea of unlfloation auoh ae oommon air trans­
port, personnel and pay policies, jol&t schooling, unified 
overeeaa oowaande, and military juatloe, as Mar% Leva,^ 
aesietant to the Defense secretary, pointed out, atrateglo 
decisions on missions and means could not be worked out as 
cooperative planning ventures by mutual agreement and com­
promise, Budget restrictions posed such impossible obstacles 
in the way of balanced forces that the harmonious, considered 
determination of what was best for the Nation, as forrestal 
had envisaged his job as Secretary of Defense, had degenerated 
into hopeless efforts to resolve the bickering between the Bevy 
and Air Force on what measures would be least harmful to the 
Nation. Power of decision was required after ail, even 
though that decision along with insufficient means might 
mean catastrophe. An attempt had to be mude in determining 
what would hurt the military posture least. As Forrestal 
phrased it during his last appearance before the Senate 
Armed Services committee on 24 March 1947, four days before 
leaving office, the bitter experience of eighteen months had
^Ibid.. 389-394, 475-47*.
^Senate 1949 Unification Hearings, 256-261.
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gradually changed hie opinions conoemlng the danger# of 
etrong powers for the seoretary of Defense until;
. , . I am also convinced that a failure to endow 
this official with sufficient authority to control 
effectively the conduct of our military affairs will 
force upon us far greater security risks then will 
be the case if singleness of control and responsi- 
bility are achieved.?
The Hoover design for strength through weakness.
Thus, with the passing of the compromiser, also began the 
first of the severe trials for the Navy in 1949, the 
spectacle of a Congress blindly following the recoimendatlons 
of the Hoover Commission and bent upon giving the Secretary 
of Defense increased power to knock heads together In the 
military establishment. As some of the heads might be naval, 
the portents of the amendments to the 1947 eot being con­
sidered by Congress were not favorable. The proposal in-
10eluded many radical changes. Increased authority for the 
Secretary of Defense to direct and control was aided by 
changing the loose amalgamation of the National Military 
Establishment into a single executive Department of Defense. 
The superior Cabinet status of the Secretary of Defense was 
further embellished by reducing the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
from autonomous executive departments to mere military depart­
ments without even representation on the National security 
Council to supplement their dubious Cabinet representation,
^Bid" 9'
10;bid.. 265~274,
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nov fully lienleil. A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff 
presl4e& over the Joint Chiefs solely as an expediter and 
coordinator of their business» yet with prestige, if not 
power, that was only too reminiscent of the bugaboo military 
dictator, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, so dearly 
beloved by the wehrmaoht and the Army. A vast hierarchy also 
stood at the summit with a Deputy yeoretary of Defense and 
Assistant gearstarlas, delving end prying into the myriad 
operations of the military departments, with powers, but not 
necessarily the knowledge, to rationalise budget, accounting, 
supply, and personnel procedures as recommended by the 
Eoover Commission.
All in all, the proposed legislation was dangerous 
to the Navy and the Nation if Congress insisted on a subter­
fuge to hide the basic defect of the military establishment, 
a lack of means that no amount of reorganization could cure 
with puerile economy. Forrestal had left hie office as a 
beaten and broken man, shattered by the overwhelming burden 
of distributing deficits in national security. Now, a 
legislative screen was proposed to conceal these deficits 
from the entire Nation, Former President Hoover disclosed 
the fragile character of the proposed palliative by promising 
that a 10 per cent savings of one and one half billion dollars 
annually in the military burden would still attain » . . .  the 
same ends for less expenditures, . Nothing was advocated,
11 1)0-131.
-55"
Bven by w r #  globally mlnda4 and profaaeloaally qaallflad me* 
than the former prealdeat, to eloee the gap, ten times larger 
than the promised savings, between means and the ends required, 
whieh obviously were not the "same ends" as the Hoover eon- 
cept, if the military establishment were to measure up to the 
criteria of force demanded by the treacherous world environ­
ment.
Even Kenneth Royall, who had replaced Patterson as 
Secretary of the Army, but who shared his prejudices for 
straight line command, found that the despicable methods of 
the Hoover Commission in crucifying the military on a cross
of waste forced him into mild rebuttal of the innuendo and
falsehoods used to promote corrective legislation* Deliberate
misstatements of fact, such as, "Under projects for fiscal
year 1950 the Army asked for funds to modernize 102 more
12tanks than it possessed," had to be answered, in this case 
hy%
When the original budget estimates were made in 
July 194#, the Army had in its possession the exact 
number of tanks budgeted for. In September 194#, 102 
tanks were transferred to the Marine Corps* The 
budget was adjusted accordingly at that time.^^
To a similar accusation that a clerical error had added 
thirty million dollars to the Army budget estimate, Royall 
proved that the figure appeared only as a partially eradi­
cated stencil correction, was not included in any totals,
175.
^^Loo. olt.
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and, further, was forwarded eorreotly in ©lean eopy to the 
Bureau of the B u d g e t . Royall requested the Great sagiaeer.
In a Personal letter on 7 March 1949, to refute ten of these 
flagrant falsehoods, widely publicized by one of Hoover’s 
subcommittees, but the official subcommittee report was not 
changed, even in the case of more glaring allegations, 
equally false, such as misplacing nine thousand tanks and 
falling to account for over seventy divisional sets of equip- 
ment*^^
Still, over a month later, the secretary of the Army, 
testifying in favor of the proposed amendments to the unifi­
cation act, was careful to salve the delicate sensibilities 
of the Republicans, now again a minority on the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, with the following remark:
I am sure that Mr. Hoover personally, with his 
many responsibilities, has not had an opportunity to 
take this letter and compare it with the report, and 
I do not infer there was any intention on his part 
at all to misrepresent the facts or permit erroneous 
Inferences to be drawn. He is a great supporter of 
national defense and a fair and high-principled 
American citizen,
If this rather dubious tribute is accepted at its face value,
then it can only be concluded that Hoover, by losing control
over his Commission on organization of the Executive Branch
of the Goveamment, set a rather poor example of what his
recommendations were intended to effect, namely, more efficient
direction through improved governmental organization,
^^Ibid.. 177.
l^lbld,, 174-178, 180.
^^Ibid., 174.
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Notwlthatanding, the argumenta of the aoover ^opo- 
aala had much merit. Yet, as testimony leading to the ori­
ginal unification act of 1947 had indicated, simple charts 
and blanket authority were no substitutes for the dynamic 
personal equation of superior leadership, armed with un- 
suppressed advice. In solving security problems, since these 
problems had been made insolvable by limit# in appropria­
tions for defense, the new legislation appeared to be no 
panacea for military ills, particularly when much of the 
evidence favoring the legislation had been fraudulently 
manufactured,
Maval impotence against Hoover normalcy. Neverthe­
less, the Navy had no defense against the proposed amend­
ments because the purse strings binding the military 
establishment had to be unraveled by some new means, poli­
tical and allegedly economic circumstances prevented a 
defense effort sufficient for any credible answer that the 
assigned missions under existing unification law and agree­
ments, which required balanced forces, could be accomplished 
by the three services, collectively or separately. Therefore, 
the power to improvise some sort of answer to the defease 
quandary had to be devised for the secretary of Defense,
This was inevitable, and the Navy did not choose to fight a 
losing battle against the overwhelming odds supporting the 
organizational changes. The array of opposition was indeed 
formidable, composed of a powerful triumvirate that included
first, a President, #ho, after his re-eleotlon victory was
flashed, confident, and mmzllng dissidents opposing his 
17legislation; second, a Congress, economy-minded as nsnal 
in areas of no oonoem to voting constituents; and last, 
but certainly not least, the Hoover Commission, transformed 
Inadvertently from a 1948 stalking-horse for Republican 
sabotage of the Democratic Executive to a 1949 Presidential 
and Congressional demonstration of nonpartisanship in oiling 
the creaking wheels of government. Besides, the only 
legitimate ground for such a naval fight was advocacy of 
more money for defense as a substitute for the organisa­
tional changes designed to force quietus, although not 
correctness, on Interservice wrangling. However, even those 
armed components with leas political finesse than the Ravy 
recognized the futility of allegedly proposing to strangle 
an economy that was and Is a vital Ingredient for long-term 
vletoiy. The Ravy saved its consummate skill for the 
politically possible, which In this case certainly could 
not include the correct answer, further curtailment of 
economic normalcy in conspicuous civilian consumption.
Collective guilt frustrates solution of defense 
quandary. Unfortunately, obtaining a correct answer to this 
economic and political dilemma was the paramount requirement 
for security because the power of the economy for military 
use, which alone could provide the sinews necessary to save
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th# total aoomomy, and much also of more Importano# baaldaa, 
i# not maaanzad merely In terms of over-all existing or 
potential eapaeity. Militarily usable eeoaoaie power in an 
era of powerful weapons oapable of quick decision is measured 
primarily in terms of long-lead time items already poeseessd 
in advanced designs, not common to civilian use* This is 
true regardless of whetber these economic tools of war are 
jigs, hydraulic presses, and armament factories capable of 
sustained military production, are a vital military inventory 
of jets, plutonium activated hydrogen bombs, and other 
weapons, or are essential cadres of trained individuals and 
units for armament, civil defense, end military organizations* 
By contrast, conspicuous production and consumption 
of deep-freezers, television sets, and automobiles, while 
perhaps educational as exercises in industrial management and 
civilian mores, are of no value to the military power 
potential unless an improbable conversion period iS inexplica­
bly allowed by fortuitous events, abnormally purveyed by an 
aggressor*s premature and witless disclosure of frightful 
intentions and capabilities* Even defenestrated Czechoslo­
vakia, blockaded Berlin, subverted Greece, and the later 
dlvulgence of soviet atomic capabilities failed to qualify as 
fortuitous events for the west and the United states, except 
in the most limited sense, because these incidents provided 
inadequate, even though great, stimulants for a proper 
defense posture* On 21 October 1949, a month after the
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President's disclosure of a soviet atomic explosion, General
George Marshall, In someahat surprised optimism, noted that
the Nation's defenses had remained as well afloat as they
did In the post-world War II period largely due to overt
18Soviet pressure. However, only the Korean Incident, 
eight months after Marshall cited obvious external Incentive* 
for defense, possibly qualifies as a fortuitous and fortunate 
event allowing an Improbable period of partial conversion 
from a civilian to a military economy commensurate with the 
need* of the Ration since 1945« More dismally, even this 
happy picture may fade because the probability appears large 
that this partial conversion will be discontinued expllcably 
by unfortunate events, such as temporary Soviet passivity, 
which will assist a wishful return to normalcy, Impossible for 
this Nation to deny.
This awareness of the Navy and the other armed forces 
about the political Impossibility of demanding the necessary 
sacrifices for a correct economic approach to the problem of 
defense, except with the help of a fortune not bestowed 
Indigenously, was perhaps buttressed by the fact that some 
historical evidence exists to indicate the psychological 
unpreparedness of the United states for the sacrifices 
required of a world leader. Power came to the Nation too 
easily end too quietly without a necessary leavening of 
"blood, sweat, and tears." The people of the United States
^^House 1949 Strategy Hearings, 600.
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and its leaders have never been forced to demonstrate stamina 
for continued sacrifice except in the most perfunctory 
fashion during rare and short periods of unusual stress, more 
than obvious to all, which even at their worst have still 
tested only small segments of the collective will. This 
idyllic state of affairs, historically unique among the 
great powers, has failed to provide the events, tradition, or, 
more rationally, indoctrination necessary in preconditioning 
the individual end collective wills of the Nation for sustained 
sacrifice. Cheap lessons of temporary trial have been soon 
forgotten. This forgetfulness bodes ill for maintaining the 
predominant position of the United States when faced with 
the costly, lengthy ordeal of uneasy, partial peace required 
to prevent, or to meet, successfully the supreme test of 
total war with the soviet Union. As was intimated previously 
in the criteria of Chapter I, all elements of ultimate power 
are worthless without the will to match the final ends with 
the necessary intermediate means, without other elements, 
will alone may not prevail, yet without will, other elements 
of power wither and waste away.
A profound critic. General George Marshall, has 
blamed this frail reed of the Nation's collective will as the 
culprit responsible for the insolvable problems of security, 
of which the internal dissensions of the Department of Defense 
were only a partial manifestation. After speaking of the 
Nation's will inspired by the adrenalin of war in contrast to 
the sad decline of public opinion toward necessary defense
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la time of pomoe, Marshall explained why this deoay of will 
warn the primary reason for strong, oantrallzed oontrol by 
ths Secretary of Defease, which frustrated differences 
unamenable to austere placatlon, rather than for a better 
organization based on the Intelligent compromises possible 
with adequate means. In reminiscences on the evolution of 
the military establishment since 1945, which were designed 
to ausuage the wounds of the Navy and the Department of 
Defense caused by the heat of controversy in 1949, Marshall 
pinpointed the basic issue, the collective will or public 
opinion, as follows:
. . . So I have always felt that the organization 
should be built to meet that issue more than merely 
what is the best organization, when you go to war, 
because you can find your compromises then under the 
great outpouring of patriotic effort on the part of 
everybody.
I felt ail along there hadn't been enough emphasis 
given to that phase of the matter, I felt particular­
ly here in the past two or three years that we have 
been misled as to the workability of what we are 
doing In some respects by the fact that we have a great 
stimulant toward military appropriations which I hope 
In due time will be completely lacking— that Is our 
feelings regarding the Soviet Union* When that 
lapses and we do get to a better accord, then, Im­
mediately the military forces are in great difficul­
ties to maintain themselves at a reasonable state 
of efficiency and a reasonable state to provide for 
prompt expansion.
Now, my associates who differed with me did so,
I felt, largely on the ground that they thought 
America had learned its lesson, when it comes to 
appropriations in piping times of peace, I don't 
think America will ever learn its lesson, because the 
political pressures are tremendous. In the next 
place, my associates haven't lived through the 
education I had had in the 19^0'* and the immediate problems I had inherited In 1938, 1939, and 1940,
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vhen o m  degree of poverty was very tryliig, I 
eould well uaderstaad that, They ju&t thought I 
uadereatljnated public opinion in the United States.
Well, I am a great respecter of public opinion, 
but, on the other hand, I em also a great respecter 
of the tremendous political influence of the budget 
and the fact that it almost gets beyond control when 
it relates to things that do not produce immediate 
results like good roads, agriculture matters, and 
auch.1%
following this veiled tribute to the gluttony of political 
pork in contrast to the starvation of Tommy Atkins at the 
Oongressional banquet table, Marshall continued;
So 1 was all the more Interested in seeing some 
form of unification adopted which would work. And 
that, of course, as you all well know better than 
I do because you have been sitting in with it and 
I have not— '1 hunt for peaceful quarters these days—  
is a very difficult thing.
All of this resolves itself, in my mind, to this; 
What we ere striving for is the security of our 
country, the security of its Influence in the world, 
because we cen*t evade the fact that et the present time 
it is the leading nation of the world, wnat we have 
to consider along with that is how we manege to meet 
the situation without finw&cial tribulations result­
ing from it. That means several things. It means,
I think, in the first place, that we have to, out of 
the cleverness of somebody's mind or the vision of 
somebody's mind, find more economical ways of doing 
some of these things that must be done. It also 
means very definitely that the money that we are 
given must be spent with greet discretion. There you 
have the root of your trouble, how is that to be managed?^"
Hoover had previously answered this question with his 
remedy for curing an alleged 10 per cent operational waste 
in the military establishment, an estimate renhered suspect, 
at least in pert, by either fraudulent, dubious, or, at
loc. bit.
'ibid.. 600-602.
20,
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b#8t, la*ufflol#at ®vié®nee. Was that the answer George 
Harebell sought? He dia not ohoose to say directly he- 
amuse, by the time he spoke, the tools for head*knooklmg 
eeohomy had not only been provided, but head-knooklng 
hands had twisted the helm of the military establishment 
even earlier. Nevertheless, Marshall stood almost alone 
In fearlessly feeing the dilemma of whether America would 
ever have the will to deny political pressures In assuming 
a defense posture worthy of survival. Moreover, Marshall, 
without a fruitless clarion call, simply Invited attention 
to the hopelessness of the military position within the 
inevitable political milieu.
AS Chief of gtaff of the Army in world War II, 
Marshall had been duly grateful that military appropria­
tions had not hamstrung victorious war operations, in spite 
of the fact that the Initial «degree of poverty was very 
trying." As a postwar diplomat and secretary of state, 
Marshall did not appear surprised. In view of his previous 
experiences between the World wars, that the price of force 
required In support of diplomacy, even allegedly poor 
diplomacy, was grievously Ignored in sustaining and 
evaluating his efforts, especially in China, where, in 
return for fifty billion dollars annually, an American 
Army of two million men, and half a million casualties, 
the United states, at best, would still be policing and 
fighting with no reward in sight. Instead, probably m>re
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*e?*re peaeltle# *oui& already be Impoeed du# to complete 
helpleaeaeee elsewhere, obviously, such a price was ami 
le not worth paying In China, contrary to the eenae of cer- 
tain element# of the Eightieth Congress and its holdover#, 
who appeared and appear to want presumably more aavory, 
but impossible, results at no appreciable cost. Neverthe­
less, in spite of the "hunt for peaceful quarters," 
Marshall was yet to wear another thorny hat, that of 
secretary of Defense, during the Korean incident, also 
«whan our degree of poverty was very trying."
Still, Marshall, like Pershing and many others 
in the armed forces, could still bear his cross with 
loyal honor and confine his pent feelings, while still in 
the pay of the government as a General of the Army, to a 
mere aside, brought out under Congressional questioning, 
which, in its alarm during the month after disclosure of 
presumed soviet atomic capabilities, inquired about the 
dubious ixeoutive budget restrictions. In reply, Marshall 
said:
The best comment I think I could make on 
that is that my original conception of the working 
of this unity was that it was desirable that the 
Congress, in the law, require once a year a report 
by the Chiefs of Staff on the requirements for the 
national defense.
Mr. stimson and I had long discussions on 
that because I felt that that should be made 
entirely outside of, we will say, civilian control.
It is only a statement and nothing more. Now the
- 6 6 -
minute euoh » statement Is mad# It would them 
pas* into, w# will say, the control of the olfH 
power# of the dovernaeat* , . *1
After more of his tsotful evasion of nasty word#, perhaps
more appropriate than the one# qualified by *we will
say," Marshall finally oame to the point where he had no
ehoioe without obscuring hi# meaning;
There was quite a bit of difference between 
Mr. atlmeon and myself. He was such a wise 
ohap that I was very hesitant about opposing 
hie views. But what I was after wcs that 
period la time of peace when It is very diffi­
cult to get a correct expression from the 
military authorities so long as the expression 
is controlled politically** before it is 
rendered.' '
speaking very Intimately, I saw General 
Pershing in the position where his views didn't 
count at ell. He could never get them up for 
consideration. And yet he was a man of great 
prestige In this country. But the cuts and 
cuts and cuts came despite what he felt* The 
main reason for this was that he had no opportunity 
to give public expression without being in the 
position of disloyalty* of course, he never 
would have done that.*^
This effort by Marshall, to raise the political 
curtain concealing realistic defense estimates had, of 
course, never been realized nor was It to be. Also, doubt 
exists as to whether the unveiling of reality would have 
had any significant result since the fundamental cause of
2*%bld., 604
2XItalics not In original,
23House 1949 Strategy Hearings, 604*
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aefiolenoles, what the traffle of publie opinion 
would bear in the way of aaerifiee without the exletenee 
of overwhelming emotional pressures not readily produced 
rationally and indigenously in the Dnited 8tatea, would 
still have thwarted even the most reasoned approaoh to 
mass education on defense neoessities. Beverthelesa, Marshall 
had produced the most honest and convincing picture of 1949 
about the defense dilemma.
CHAPTER V 
THE NAVT RHWa AMOK
• . » We of greater age, and, we hope, more 
mature judgment are fearful that the country is 
being, if it haa not already been, mold a false 
bill of goods.— Vice Admiral Gerald Bogan*
21̂  RRËü a i Rgmm la&R A ayaais-
ian opportunism. In contrast to Marshall, the Hairy played a 
low, MacArthurian role in that fateful year. The Havy, with 
loud trumpeting, evaded the basic problems so ably stated by 
Marshall and deviously compounded confusion by willful dis­
regard for constituted authority backed by legislative sanc­
tion. The naval maneuvers of 1949 cast grave discredit on 
the Havy and mntrasted markedly with its previously meri­
torious efforts to prevent damage to the Ration by Executive 
fiat that usurped prerogatives which only Congress could as­
sign by law. With the door closed to politically tenable 
methods for further constructive assistance to the Congress 
in discharging its unique responsibility "to make rules for 
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces," 
as demanded in part by Section 8, Article I, of the Constitu-
^Letter from AdmixttlBogan to Secretary Matthews, 20 
September 1949, cited in full by Anav and Havv Journal. 8 
October 1949.-------------------------
mè$m
tion, the Navy was forced to let this front fall by default, 
while the oonstrictlve recommendations of the Hoover Commis­
sion were ultimately passed by Congress without appreciable 
change and became law on 10 August 1 9 4 9 However, with 
adroit political opportunism, the Navy used other events in 
1949 for dramatising its own impoverished role In national 
defense, but selfishly neglected or disparaged the vital 
functions performed separately or as a team by its associate 
armed forces, which had also been cut to the bone, and 
flagrantly flaunted the rule of the armed forces by law that 
the Navy had previously so ably helped Congress establish in 
order to rationalise control of the military establishment*
Because the budgetary and appropriation restrictions 
had forced the Nation*a ar%ed forces into unbalanced weakness 
that was politically irredeemable without the mat grotesque 
and inadvertent collaboration of the SoViet Bnion or the un- 
con tilled blundering of a Soviet satellite, the Navy now 
chose to isyose its own unilateral conception of grand strate­
gy on the Nation in opposition to legal authority in such a 
manner as to reconcile the defense unbalance with continued 
strength for the Navy. With the passing of forrestal, the 
political opportunity for presenting the potentially more 
disastrous alternative of the Navy was soon in coming.
The die for emphasis on the sledge hammer of power,
item in the Agi M i  # v y  D  August
1949.
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strategic air, in contrast to balanced forces, had, of course, 
already been oaat.^ The president, perhaps impressed by the 
air tonnages being flown to Berlin and the deceptive quiet 
elsewhere except for the China morass, which he correctly did 
not choose to get bogged down in, remained adamant for a 
ceiling of fifteen billion dollars a year, presumably a new 
level of defense expenditure brought about by the crisis of 
Czechoslovakia and Berlin earlier in 19t f , but this in actu­
ality failed even to replace depreciated end obsolescent 
inventory carry-overs in equipment from World war II that had 
previously strengthened deficiencies of the armed forces in 
appropriations. on 9 December 1948, the quandary the Joint 
Chiefs of staff had faced in not being able to meet their 
assigned missions was presented to the President with no 
avail. At that time forrestal had begged for two billion 
more in contrast to the rock-bottom estimate of nine billion 
additional the Joint Chiefs had required after slicing their 
best service experts from a fifteen billion increase, for- 
restal, at last, saw that strategic air power and the atom 
had to be the sole reliance of the Nation, supported only by 
the minimum aid from the other armed services necessary for 
the limited air offensive from England* With the Air force 
taking cuts from its minimum estimate of seventy groups to 
forty-eight even to meet this reduced defense objective and 
with the tenability of England doubtful due to the forfeit
^Supra. 50-52.
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of the European penlaeula assured by limited American capa­
bilities» Forrestal demonstrated increasing sympathy for the 
one offensive arm remaining. On 20 December, he pleaded 
again with the President for seven hundred million dollars 
for the weapon of last resort, the intercontinental bomber, 
which might be the only damaging weapon left in the event of 
all-out war. Instead of this requested increase, the defense 
budget was fwrtWr dented by another three hundred million 
dollar out when the President transmitted it to Congress on 
10 January 1949*^
Bead-knocking hands at the helm. The tragic reper­
cussions to defense deficiencies fell with fury on the capable 
and strong ahoulders of Louis Johnson, who succeeded Forrestal 
as Secretary of Defense. Bead-knocking was the only choice 
he had in bringing some order out of the chaos created by his 
Commander in Chief, and head-knocking he loyally did without 
quarter or equivocation. Because of the upward fluctuation 
in defense spending at the start of Fiscal Tear 1949, caused 
by the temporary panic of the President and the Congress as 
a result of the Csech and Berlin crises, Johnson now had to 
cut this rate of expenditure in order to enter Fiscal Tear 
1950, beginning in July 1949, in systematic fashion, if the 
rate imposed by the President for the new year, ending with 
the Korean incident, were to be met. Also Johnson had his 
sights set on Hoover's goal of approximately thirteen billion
^Forrestal, 510, 535-53#.
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â&Xlars anmuaXXy» whioh w&s receiving universal acclaim on 
Capital Hi XX as the reward for favoring the proposed amend­
ments to the unification act of X947*^
A juicy, fat pXum, waiting to be plucked, %m# the 
Havy’s supercarrier, now only a keel, but soon to require a 
steady replenishments of jets and medium bombers, purportedly 
competing with instead of complementing the Air Force. Less 
than a month after taking office, on 23 April 1949, Johnson 
directed cancellation of the carrier* s construction. Secre­
tary of the lavy John L. Sullivan, shorn Forrestal had left 
capably defending naval interests since 1947, had already 
chosen to resign on 24 March after Johnson's threat that the 
entering Secretary of Defense would be forced to have him re­
moved for disloyalty, ifow, still in office on 26 April due 
to a replacement lag, Sullivan fancifully postdated his 
original letter, which was to remain concealed in the Presi­
dent's files for six awnre months, by bringing it fictitiously 
current in a supplementary letter of resignation to Johnson, 
publically blasting him for administrative defiance of the 
will of the President, the Congress, and tl» îfavy.̂  Was this 
the political opportunity the Wavy was waiting for to press 
their new strategic theories? Any rmval optimism for a 
Congressional investigation was shattered that same day wh&n
^House 1949 Strategy Hearings, 624-625. 
6j&id., 622-623.
&eprem*Btatlve Carl Vlnaon, Democrat of Georgia, Chairman 
of the House Armed Services Committee, and valiant ally of 
the Navy for many years as former head of the old Haval 
Affairs Committee, showed that even he had been hypnotised 
by Hoover's siren song for economy. In an impassioned burst 
of Georgian eloquence, Vinson declaimed on #ie House floori
Mr. Speaker, last Saturday the Honorable Louis 
Johnson, Secretary of Defense, made a courageoiai 
and a momentous decision. He ordered the termina­
tion of the construction of the 65,000 ton so-called 
super carrier.
In years past I helped build a two-ocean Havy.
I am proud to think that was correct for we need a 
two-ocean Havy to fight any war that comes.
How we know that If war should ever come again 
It will be a struggle with a land power.
It is simply a matter of the proper allocation 
of war missions between the Havy and the Air Force.
It Is the business of the Air Force to use 
long-range boadiers In time of war. And yet, this 
carrier was to accommodate su# long-range bombers.
We cannot afford the luxury of two strategic 
air forces. We cannot afford an experimental ves­
sel that, even without its aircraft, costs as much 
as 60 1-36 bombers.
We should reserve strategic air warfare to the 
Air Force.
And we should reserve to the Havy Its historic 
role of controlling the seas. I do not now— and I 
never will— advocate depreciation of our Havy.
Secretary Johnson is to be commended for the 
nature of his decision and for moving promptly to 
resolve this important matter.7
The door had slamawd again. However, Vinson, in a 
previous statement to the press, attempting to free Johnson 
of the sniping of quasl-offlclal prof essional journals and 
unauthorized press releases, left one despicable Ingress to 
the formwr welcoming legislative font. This dubious
621*
invitation reads
Armed Services Committee want it clearly 
understood that if persons in the armed services 
or in their employ continue to pass statements to 
the press which are calculated to depreciate the 
activities of a sister service and which, at the 
saw time, jeopardise the national security, the 
committee will step in with a full-scale investi- 
gation^ Me will not tolerate the continuance of 
this practice,*
An opportunist qualifies agisi opoortunism. At 
least one person in the employ of the lavy seemed to welcome 
Vinson* s encouraging word about the happy result to be expect­
ed from increased propaganda production. Rapidly, the Kavy 
Department appeared to overtake and perhaps even to excel the 
Air Force in the leaking of security information mixed with 
falsehoods and innuendo. At this time, the only active sieve, 
according to later investigation, was Cedric Worth, an ably 
qualified man for this particular task. His experience in­
cluded a wide range of facile penmanship. He had supplemented 
a generation of itinerant newspaper experience, self-training 
of a high quality in all but ethics, with even more versatile 
writing of movie scenarios and mystery books, including The 
Trail of the Serpent and The Corpse That Knew Everybody. How­
ever, his paramount journalistic jewel was won as a ghost 
writer for "Alf" Landon, even though his authorship of "Out 
of the Rocks with Landon and Knox" was not substantiated.
In spite of Worth*s indubitable talent as a civilian
^Ibid.. 612.
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journalist, Pate had been most unkind to him, in keeping him 
from the summit of his profession, until the Navy, in marked 
contrast to the blindness of civilian oontemporaries, boosted 
him rapidly during World War II from a humble lieutenant, 
writing ship-sinking obituaries for naval public relations 
in New York City, to the exalted rank of commander on Consti­
tution Avenue, Washington. There, one of his primary duties 
was to translate the security-hampered and brass-bound 
strategic decisions and naval tactics of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, Admiral King, into acceptable form for release 
to an eagerly awaiting public.
A fitting reward for his consummate skill in this 
duty quickly followed his separation from active naval ser­
vice when, in November of 1946, that apogee of power in civil 
service, the anonymous role of special assistant to political 
appointees, was thrust upon him by a grateful Navy. However, 
only a pitiful pittance of eighty-five hundred dollars an­
nually as monetary incentive was included. Nevertheless, 
tW power potential of his new position, unpretentiously 
titled Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Air, should have Impressed Worth and unquestionably 
did, because special assistants at this level in the execu­
tive departments wield tremendous influence, particularly 
when they can carry weak Presidential appointees on their 
shoulders. In any event, special assistants serve a very 
important and necessary function, which, to paraphrase a
crude expression of naval humor, is primarily to keep the 
naked Ignorance of their superiors from Indecent official or 
public display. Cedric Worth, in a more refined understate­
ment, intimated that he had been recruited as a naval civil­
ian employee because a new, unindoctrinated, Assistant 
Secretary . * was very badly in need of someone who under­
stood Navy procedures and administration, . . ."9
By the time Vinson had promised his investigation if 
leaks continued to the press, Worth had cl imbed another rung 
of the bureaucratic ladder, and was then an executive assist­
ant to the Vnder Secretary of the Navy, Dan Kimball, another 
new appointee in the kaleidoscope of transitory faces in the 
Department of Defease. Kimball was also impressed by Worth's 
capabilities in providing painless recruit training in naval 
lore. In this position, as earlier with the Assistant Secre­
tary for Air, Worth had duties that required an Intimate 
knowledge of the top security data of national defense, in­
cluding controversial aircraft performance characteristics 
and other items bouncing around the Department of Defense in 
the Navy-Air Force feud,^®
the alleged nefarious conspiracy. Combining his 
newly acquired technical knowledge with his previous skill in
^Committee on Armed Services, House of Represents-
Investigation.
*25, 614, 554, 557.
Immglmatlve writing. Worth fabricated an anoayoous document 
of half-truths and lies, the gist of which warn the allega­
tion that a nefarious conspiracy existed between tecretary 
of Defense Johnson, Secretary of the Air Force Symington, 
and Floyd Wl%m, of Consolidated Aircraft and Atlas Corpora­
tions, to take over control of the Defense Department and 
pour the major part of the American defense effort into an 
obsolescent heavy bomber, the B-36. This detailed and re­
dundant coi^ilation of purported facts supporting Worth's 
main thesis was introduced by the following preamble, which 
set the teneur of the %diole dociment;
The questions raised by this compilation of 
information are not directed at air power. The 
discussion of machines is incidental, and is in­
cluded only to Illuminate the conduct of men who 
have at their disposal Immense sums of public 
moneys.
A sad lesson of history is that whenever money 
in such quantities is available, there appear men 
of a certain kind determined to obtain it by any 
means. It is nearly but not quite possible to 
cover all tracks in pursuit of this end. As the 
course of events becomes evident, honest men are 
afflicted with sham», and are reluctant to push 
the mess into light. There is a tendency to draw 
back, to hope that change will occur without 
scandal. However, there arrives a recognisable 
moment When unscrupulous men become overconfident 
and create circumstances that are intolerable.
They may then be eliminated. That moment is close 
at hand with relation to the efforts of the Atlas 
Corp. to take over the Rational Defense Establish­
ment,
Many of the impartant facts in this story have 
been published. But the reference of these facts 
to each other has been obscured by a cloud of con­
fusion skillfully induced through fanciful and fas­
cinating tub-thumping in the naaw of air power.
This brief compilation is not evidence* It brings 
the pictyre into focus and indicates matters ripe 
for investigation. It is not complete. Any
which are net desonetrahie fact are
eo indicated. 13.
At last, the Navy regained the interest of Congress. 
Worth circulated his docuiraint to numerous figures on Capitol 
Hill; including Representative Van Zandt, Republican from 
Pennsylvania, Captain in the Naval Reserve, and Past National 
Gommnder of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. This recipient, 
triply fit as an exponent of national defense, particularly 
the naval view, viciously paraphrased Worth's document in a 
speech to the House of Representatives on 26 May 1949* Full 
scale, formal hearings on the allegations, with the assist­
ance of well-Qualified legal counsel, specially hired, were 
assigned by the House to the Committee on Armed Services 
early in June. After an assiduous period of preliminary in­
vestigation, the hearings began on 9 August 1949.3-̂
Fraud exposed. But, alas, the Navy, even yet, was 
not invited to give its unilateral view on grand strategy. 
Instead the Department of Defense and the Air Force succeeded 
in getting the falsehoods corrected with the help of nearly 
all the major aircraft producers competing with Odium of Con­
solidated, except a disgruntled Glenn Martin. He had appar­
ently collaborated in a juicy tidbit to the Worth document. 
This alleged that the Emerson Electric Company of Symington, 
prior to Symington's severance from industry to enter govern-
lllbid.. 15-20.
1-15.
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mmt «#rvio#, had attempted with Air force eoanivaace to take 
over Martin*8 contract for tmrreta during World War II.
In contrast to the splendid performance of its 
enemies, the Wavy was limited to two tragic characters.
Worth*a chastened student, Wavy Wnder Secretary Kimhall, indi- 
cated with chagrin that confidence in his capable tutor had 
been "painfully c h a n g e d . In extenuation of his own deplor­
able conduct, Cedric Worth could only say, on 24 Augusts
I was greatly concerned. As the document 
indicates, It appears to me that the defenses of 
the country are going in the wrong direction and 
are being materially weakened by propaganda which 
is not true,15
However, Worth manfully agreed the next day with the question
of the comdLttee counsels
And you realise that at least the United States 
Government is fwtunate in having forthright and 
honorable men in charge of its procurement of,air­
craft and in the operation of the air force?!®
Ohaixmian Viwon irrevocably closed this particular 
phase of the naval tragedy with unanimous expression of the 
sentiment of his committees
There has not been, in my judgment, and I 
satisfied in the judgment of the entire committee,
one iota, not one scintilla of evidence offered 
thus far in these hearings that would support charges 
that collusion, fraud, corn#tion, influence, or 
favoritism played any part whatsoever in the pro­
curement of the B-36 bomber.
There has been very substantial and compelling 
evidence that the Air Force selected this boriber,
O lhld.. 17, 615.
Ulbid. ■ 614.
527.
653.
procured this bomber solely on the ground that this 
is the beet aircraft for its purpose available to 
the Nation today.
At this time I feel that the Nation should know 
that the Secretary of the Air, Mr, Symington, and 
the leaders of the Air Force, the Secretary of De­
fense, have come through this inquiry without the 
slightest blemish and that these men continue to
merit the complete confidence of the American people
in their past action and in the future#17
Another naval martvr. The Congressional door previ­
ously left ajar by Vinson was slowly closing again on the 
Navy, Would another martyr in the naval cause appear? Al­
though Cedric Worth* s direct charges had all been found false,
there still remained a bone for biased contention and judg­
ment on the subject of the strategic policy dictated by 
limited military appropriations. While Vinson*a Committee 
suspended hearings from 25 August to 5 October and a naval 
court of inquiry sat, both were confirming Cedric’s desire 
for final formal walking papers from his meteoric naval 
c a r e e r , The tiiw for an even more spectacular martyrdom 
had definitely arrived If this placid interlude were to be 
tempestously stirred into the Navy’s last chance for an ef­
fective hearing on its unique strategic theories. The burden 
of this sacrifice was voltmtarily assumed by a top-flight 
naval aviator. Captain John Crommelln, imminently due for am 
assured promotion to rear admiral. Crommelln released a long, 
involved statement to the press in violation of defense
17ibid,. 654-655.
659.
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information rule# in mid-September. Hie etetemeot had been 
originally prepared for the B-)6 inquiry, but he now feared 
that this press release was the only way to save his cogent 
remarks for posterity since the Congressional hearings had 
cooled to a simmer. Crommelln finally brought the naval 
grievances over the recently passed amendments to the unifi­
cation act, called the Tydings Bill, into the open with ful­
some praise of Worth*s objectives, regardless of his methods, 
which drooled, in part;
It is my firm conviction that Cedric Worth 
was prompted by the highest motives of patriotism 
and selflessness in whatever action he took to 
help ggint out the dangers of the original Tydings
Crommelln, a member of the Joint Staff to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, had probably assisted Worth by furnishing raw in­
formation, but Worth* s unique pride of authorship and dis­
sémination of his scurrilous defamation remained unchallenged. 
HevertWless, Crommelln had discussed the memorandum with 
Worth and been an accessory before the fact in suggesting 
that Worth* s research mig#t be of value, if released to the 
press, in getting a B-36 inquiry started on Capitol Hill in 
what Grommelin hoped would be an entering wedge for explana­
tion of the Navy* s opposition to additional concentration of 
power in the Department of Defense.20
Fleet Admiral “Bull” Halsey and a couple of low-
19gews item in the Armv and M a w  Journal. 17 Sept.
1949.
•Ô2"*
ranklag r m r  admiral* still on active service jumped into 
the fray at once, with the "Bull* bellowing:
Having read Captain Crommelln*s statement# 
and comments, I feel very strongly that he is 
attempting to do something ^ o d  for the country 
and that he has shown wonderful courage in 
jeopardising his career by doing this. I feel 
that he deserves the help and respect of all naval officers,21
Control of the rowboat lost. The tide was rolling 
in, but Secretary of Havy Matthews, of possibly apocryphal
«rowboat" fame, who had succeeded Sullivan, vainly tried to 
stem it into channels by encouraging both the proper subordi­
nation and the free expression of naval misgivings. In a 
dispatch to all naval commanders following Crommelln*s defec­
tion, they and their subordinates were encouraged to transmit 
their views to Matthews, who promised, «The views so trans­
mitted will I assure you be used in support of the intep*ity 
and efficiency of the Naval service.«22 Matthews was being 
greatly embarrassed by those undisciplined sailors traducing 
the Air force and the Department of Defense in full public 
view.
Crommelln had been transferred to what Matthews 
thought was a less sensitive position than the Joint Staff, 
to directly under his thumb in the Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations. The command dispatch of Matthews now set
21^2 2, cit.
22ibld,. 24 September 1949.
Cromm#lin up for a uiahful oouo do graeo for tbo whole wicked 
world of intrigue against his beloved Navy. Apparently 
Gremmalln scrutinised the Secretary's mall, at least that 
portion which passed through the office of Admiral Benfield, 
Chief of Naval Operations, the top naval job under the civil­
ian hierarchy. In compliance with the directive of l&tthews 
to keep embarrassing views in official naval channels, Vice 
Admiral Gerald Bogan, commander of a principal unit of the 
Pacific Fleet, made a well-disciplined and sailorly effort to 
put his civilian chief straight on what was wrong with defense 
and the N a v y , 2 #
How proud Crommelln must have been to read these 
emtraets from Bogan's letter, written on 20 Geptmsber 1949» 
three days before the President's Soviet atomic disclosure:
At the beginning it is proper for me to state 
that in no manner have I, to date, endorsed or con­
demned Captain Crommlin's statement because no one 
has asked me to do so. Had such been the case honest 
necessity and conscience would have required hearty 
and complete agreement with the affirmations made 
in his release to or interview with the press.
The creation of three departments or sub depart­
ments where formerly there were but two la not uni­
fication. Under the present law it can be mde to 
and does operate effectively in the field. But it 
would be sheer balderda#: to assume that there has 
been anything approaching it among the Secretariat, 
the Joint Staff, or the hi#i eonand of all three 
services. Knowing that honest differences of opin­
ion must constantly be present, bickering is still 
the rule; unanimity is non-existent.
The morale of the Navy is lower today than at 
any time since I enteredklthe commissioned ranks in 
19i6. Lowered morale, to some degree, may be ex­
pected to follow any war during the readjustment
23Letter reproduced in Ibid.. 6 October 1949*
to the organitetion for peace* In my opinion 
this descent, almost to despondency, stems from 
complete confusion as to the future role of the 
Navy and Its advantages or disadvantages as a 
permanent career.
Optimistic letters and plans issue from 
Washington, And concurrently the situation de­
teriorates with each press release. The younger 
men are necessarily concerned with their future 
security. We of greater age, and, we hope, more 
smture judgment are fearful that the country is 
being, if it has not already been, sold a false 
bill of goods.
Junior officers in large numbers, whose con­
fidence I enjoy, have comm to see me asking advice 
on their future course of action. I have invari­
ably encouraged them to enhance their professional 
ability against the day when the troiAlesome ques­
tions now paramount would be equably resolved.
It is becwaingIncreasingly difficult for #e to do this honestly. 24
Thus far, all his comrades in arms from every fighting 
service, including the civilian reserve, could rally around 
Bogan and cry, "Ament " with an added prayer that their mun- 
trymen would shed their collective guilt and provide the 
mecps to proper ends. But now Bogan cited the paradox of 
defense without weapons, strength without sacrifice, and 
miracles without money, which had baffled the best. Further­
more, he supinely accepted the dilemma while implying that 
the Navy and the Havy alone could produce a miracle* This 
paradox was resolved thus*
If the adequate military or defense establish­
ment could be achieved without a navy and naval 
aviation, I would gladly advocate using funds now 
expended to maintain that service, on ^e procure­
ment of the best other necessary weapons and equip­
ment. Hot even the United States can support
Mt.
indefinitely; during pence* the tragically 
large military budget a we are devouring, 2)
Balderdaeh, indeed: Was this the first announcMmat of the
Navy* a new strategic theory of adequate force unbalanced in
favor of the Navy? In a more statesmanlike way, Bogan lashed
out at the sledge hammer of power, the strategic air force,
which did look rather silly in the tool kit with no supple­
ments;
There is no cheap quick victory possible 
between any two nations or groups of nations
each having strong even if relatively unequal
power, let at a time as potentially critical 
as ever existed during our history, the public 
has been lured into complacency by irresponsible 
Speeches by advocates of this theory. The re­
sult could be a great national and world-widecatastrophe,20
This masterful understatement was fine, but that tool kit was 
going to look even sillier if the Navy ever succeeded in re­
placing the sledge hammer with supplemental naval tools, thus 
leaving an even greater gap in our arsenal.
Perhaps now the only way to reconcile the Kavy was to 
transfer the Air Force to the Kavy and the Army to the Navy’s 
Harine Corps. Apparently, a severe neurosis, ripened by 
increasing deficits since World War II and acutely defined by 
the shock of carrier loss, had afflicted a large portion of 
the Navy. Unquestionably, this disease required urgent diag­
nosis and treatment by the Congress, beneficent healer. The 
organisational strait jacket was killing instead of curing,
^^Loc. cit..
26hoc.
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but the only better remedy, soothing bel® from an open 
Gongressionsl puree, would kill the doctors. Perhaps 
psychiatry was the answer. Would a long, soothing talk 
bring order to the havy* s chaotic state of mind?
The purloined letter. One of the "doctors," Chair­
man Vinson, thought this latter treatment mandatory, when 
his House Armed Services Committee reconvened, because 
Crommelln had publicly advertised, for the first time in an 
official Navy document, the sad mental and physical condition 
of the Kavy. The naval flyer passed Bogan's letter to the 
press on 4 October 1949, a superlative place of timing, one 
day before the advertised date of resuming, and probably con­
cluding, the B-36 investigation. The purloined copies of 
the letter were classified confidential, but Grommelin did 
not mind the unauthorised disclosure of this damaging infor­
mation to the entire world m  long as the Navy could possibly 
take over the grand strategy of the Nation, His words in­
cluded*
I consider release of the letter of Vice 
Admiral Bogan with the endorsements of Admirals 
Radford and Denfield necessary to the interests
of national security.27
Indeed, both the Commander of the Pacific Fleet and the Chief 
of Naval Operations had also confirmed in substance the views 
of Bogan, adding increased prestige to Crommelln's c o u p .
The aviator continued, "My action in this vital matter may
27N0WS item in Ibid.. Ô October 1949.
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have beam a teehnioal violation of a regulation, but it had 
to be done.*2i
2^L0G. sÂk*
GHAPTSa VI 
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* . . the publie hearing of the grlevaneee of
a few officers • . . and chargea as to our poor . . . 
preparedness, have done Infinite harm to our 
national defense, our position of leadership In 
world affairs, the position of our national 
policy, and the confidence of the people In our 
government. --General of the Army omar N* Bradley**'
Congress fans the embers. The B-36 investigation
was closed all right, just as the Navy had feared It would
be, before the Navy had its day in court. Nevertheless,
Grommelin had blown a hole in the door of Congress through
which not only the Navy, but the entire Defense Department
poured. On 5 October, after closing the Investigation of
the false charges of worth and Van Zandt, Vinson obtained
approval from his committee to broaden new hearings into a
scrutiny of all aspects of unification and strategy within
the Department of Defense. Grommelin*s hole, as described
in part by Vinson, was indeed huge, because Vinson promised:
to ascertain the views of representatives of the 
Navy and. If necessary, the other services, on 
those developments in the Department and on such of the 
items of the original agenda to which they may care 
to refer.4
%ouse 1949 Strategy Hearings, 536-537* 
^House 1949 B-36 Investigation, 660-661.
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fil© meat âay, 6 0© to ber 1949, Chairman flnsoa opened 
the hearings on unification and strategy with a clear state­
ment of the ultimate responsibility of Congress end the 
Bouse Armed services committee for the deplorable conditions 
in the Department of Defense. In unequivocal language he 
described how the action's abscess of collective guilt for 
this situation came to a festering head in Congress:
Under the Constitution, the Congress is given the 
responsibility for providing and maintaining a navy 
and for raising and supporting an army.
This responsibility cannot be delegated by the 
Congress, so until and unless the constitution is 
amended otherwise, the Congress of the united states 
cannot divorce itself of responsibility for providing 
for the armed strength of the Nation*
Now, members of the committee, under the rules 
of the House, as you all know, this Committee on Armed 
Services is charged, among other things with the 
following matters: {1\ Common defense generally;
(2) the ?*ar Department and the Military Establishment 
generally; (3) the Navy Department and the Naval 
Establishment generally; (4) size and composition 
of the Army and the Navy; (g) forts, arsenals, 
military reservations, and navy yards.'*
Over two years had passed since Congress had made this word­
ing obsolete, but presumably the Department of Defense and 
the United states Air Force were born from this conglomera­
tion and were also subject to the purview of the committee* 
Vinson continued:
The House Rules go on to say as follows:
• • , each standing committee of the Senate and 
House of Representatives shall exercise continuous 
watchfulness of the execution by the administrative 
agency concerned of any lews, the subject matter of 
which is within the jurisdiction of such committee . . .
so this committee has the responsibility which 
cannot be delegated to maintain legislative oversight
^House 1949 strategy Hearings, 1.
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of the military dapartmeats la order to see that the 
reaponslhllltles imposed upon the Congress by the Constitution are properly carried o u t , *
After this fine start, Vinson lost his footing and 
fell into rather soft ground by scoffing at the effect of the
Croaaelin incident on his end the committee's action. In 
Vinson's eordsi
?or these reasons this committee determined 4 
months ago to conduct the inquiry commencing this 
morning. The committee felt last June, and recent 
events have confirmed that view, that there have been 
sufficient concern and so much obvious disagreement 
within the Department of Defense, end that these 
disagreements involve such basic subjects affecting 
the national defense, that this committee could not 
properly ignore the situation,
80 this hearing this morning is pursuant to the 
committee's decision of 4 months ago, not— as the 
morning press might indicate— the results of events 
occurring within the last day or so or the last few 
weeks.^
While technically correct, because the original 
agenda for the B-36 investigation had included many collat­
eral matters, Vinson's committee had dragged its feet for 
four, long, critical months, on the minor diversion of the 
Van Zandt and Worth charges of criminal acts in high circles, 
without displaying further interest in basic causes for 
dissension in the military establishment, certainly, 
Orommelin's action was one of last resort to Inspire further 
interest in hearings that were about to fold up. Under the
Loo. P i t .
1-2,
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orlëiael Houee reeolatloa &utWri&ln& a foim&l inquiry, 
only tiwo pertinent 1 terne he& been on the agenda. Tbeee were:
1. TO eetabiieh the truth or falsity of ail 
charge# made by Mr. Van Zandt and by all other# th# 
committee may find or develop in the investigation.
2. Locate and identify the source from which the 
chargee, rumora, and innuendoes have come.^
The other six collateral matter# on the agenda were ones
that, Vinson was now admitting, had always been subject to
the "continuous watchfulness” of hi# committee, which
obviously had fallen down on its job except for sporadic
periods, how, belatedly, the house Armed services Oommlttee
was to do its regular job of routine surveillance, which in
this case required a follow up of the previous agenda in
order to:
3. Examine the performance characteristics of 
the B-36 bomber to determine whether it is a satis­
factory weapon.
4. Examine the role# and mission# of the Air 
Force and the Navy (especially the Navy aviation and 
Marine aviation) to determine whether or not the 
decision to cancel the construction of the aircraft 
carrier United States was sound.
5* Isiablish whether or not the Air Force is
concentrating upon strategic bombing to such an extent 
as to be injurious to tactical aviation and the 
development of adquate fighter aircraft and fighter 
aircraft techniques.
6. Consider the procedures followed by the Joint 
Chiefs of staff on the development of weapons to be 
used by the respective services to determine whether 
or not it is proposed that two of the three services 
will be permitted to pass on the weapons of the third.
7. Study the effectiveness of strategic bombing 
to determine whether the Nation is sound in following 
this concept to its present extent.
8. Consider all other matters pertinent to the 
above that may be developed during the course of the 
Investigation,^
%ouse 1949 B-30 Investigation, 637. 
^Ibld.. 660.
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/Iso, if the undisciplined oonduot of crojamelin had 
not exposed the private thoughts of the majority of naval 
officers on unification and strategy, it would be fatuous to 
assume that the Navy would have been able to do better in a 
continued investigation chaperoned by official Department of 
Defense policy than It did under similer restrictions during 
this same year when a legitimate opportunity for presenting 
the naval views occurred during the hearings on the Tydings 
amendments to the 1947 unification act. After all, Congress 
ordinarily does not Invite criticism of the law of the land 
unless extremely cogent reasons are presented for its open 
defiance. Vinson illustrated the changed atmosphere of the 
unification and strategy hearings, brought about by 
Orommelln* a decisive stroke, In comparison to previous hear­
ings of 1949 on defense matters, which were already in 
substance the will of Congress, by issuing this Invitation 
for free and frank speech;
I would like to say on behalf of the oommlttee,
although I believe the comment is probably unnecessary, 
that it is the Intent of the committee that all testi­
mony given shall be frankly and freely given and be 
given without reprisals in the Department of Defense 
against any individual presenting testimony during the 
course of these hearings.
This committee will not permit nor tolerate any reprisal against any witness in these hearings, nor 
will we permit nor tolerate any shepherding of the 
testimony being presented, we want these witnesses 
to speak what is in their minds, to put their cards 
on the table, and to do so without hesitation or per­
sonal concern, we are going to the bottom of this 
unrest end concern in the Navy. And the committee 
expects full cooperation In this effort from the
-93-
Department of Defense. When the testimony is ell in, 
the oommlttee will try to reaoh e deolelon am to what 
action le indicated in the interests of national
defense.®
Vinson had no criticism to make later about the 
freedom end frankness of the testimony although he and others 
became somewhat confused after the hearings were over, about 
the subtle distinction between reprisals and mere administra­
tive action within the Navy for more loyal organizational 
support of unification. Even the mild remonstrance of 
Secretary Matthews was Ignored by Vinson, when Matthews 
made this complaint about being too free and frank In open 
hearings;
I think that a statement made here can be harmful 
to the security of the country even though It doesn’t 
contain what might be considered technically classified 
material. I think that the whole statement, the nature 
of the statement, the effect that it has upon the 
National Defense Department and upon the administration 
of the Military Establishment of the country, and so 
far as it might disclose serious differences of 
policy and procedure, can well give to a foreseeable 
enemy something which, in my humble judgement, ought 
not to be disclosed. That is my position,°
Speaking of Admiral Radford, who was to be master of 
ceremonies and set the tenor for the unique navel strategy 
to bring more money into the naval coffers, Vinson replied 
to Matthew’s plea:
Of course, Mr. Secretary, we are not hunting 
headlines, we are trying to do a job. We are trying 
to find out what la the cause of all this unrest 
that is talked about daily in the newspapers. We want 
to know what there is to it. And we are charged by 
the rules of the House to find out how the laws that 
we have sponsored and passed are being administered.
Now, when we get to Admiral Radford, it may be, in
%ouse 1949 Strategy Bearings, 2, 
^Ibld., 3.
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the laterest of being oautious, that we may deter­
mine to have the admiral present it to us in 
ezeoutlve session. Then, if we determine that it 
is not elassified information in our judgment, we 
will release it to the public so the public con 
know what is going on.
The country supports the Nation's defense. The 
country should be cognizant all the time of every 
phase of the defense that can be publicly discussed.
That is one of the reasons for this investigation
After hearing Admiral Radford behind closed doors
the first day of the hearing, the majority of the committee
decided that his statement should be repeated in open
session for public consumption, which he did on 7 October
111949» the following day. Never have so few permitted so
much to be revealed to so many against the national interest.
The leaky naval bellows. Already the previous B-36 
investigation had disclosed that the detailed performance 
characteristics of this weapon with the atomic bomb were 
superior to other comparable choices immediately available 
for production as intercontinental war deterrents and 
retaliatory weapons. The Air Force had been forced to 
reveal officially all aspects entering into its bast pro­
fessional judgment for choosing the B-36 in order to prove 
that this airplane had been honestly procured. The Committee 
on Armed Services, as previously noted, had been compelled 
to conclude from this presentation that;
^^Loc. cit. 
lllbid., 39.
There has heem very substantial and oompelling 
evMenee that the Air foree seleoteé this bomber, 
prooureâ this bomber solely on the ground that this 
is the best airoraft for its purpose available to 
the Matioatoiay.i^
Now, however, the Navy proeeeded to indieate, in 
spite of this finding of fast by the eomaittee of the B-36 
being *the best airoraft for its purpose,» that it still 
did not meet the requirements of modern war when viewed in 
the light of the first item of the new agenda adopted by the 
commit tee, naiwly, to “examine the performance eharaeteris- 
tios of the b-36 bomber to determine whether it is a satis- 
faotory w e a p o n . R a d f o r d ’s oonolusion, supported by the 
entire staff of naval experts aooompanying him, was summed 
up as follows5
Are we as a nation to have “bomber generals» fight­
ing to preserve the obsolete heavy bomber— the battle­
ship of the alr?_ Like its surface counterpart, its day is largely past.^*
But that day was not quite past, and no substitute sledge
hammer was available if overseas land bases were denied,
even if supercarriers grew overnight.
Instead, the Navy had come to its unilateral concept 
of grand military strategy in which not only the 1-36 was 
ridiculed as a weapon, but the bizarre theory was advanced 
that strategic air warfare, crippling an enemy’s war
^^House 1949 1-36 Investigation, 655. Italics 
not in original.
l^Ibld., 660.
^^House 1949 Strategy Hearings, 47.
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potential at the eouree, although useful in the later 
stages of a war, was an unwarranted and uneoonomlc expense 
in time of peace because it did not contribute to minimum 
defense essentials. The committee could only conclude, in
summarising the Rarys position, that:
It was the Navy contention that in time of 
peace, because of severe limitations on national 
defense funds, the Nation can afford to maintain 
only those armed forces which will contribute 
directly to—
1. The defense of the united states against 
air end sea attack,
2. The defense of western Europe against land, 
sea, end air attack.
3. The defense and seizure of bases needed for 
the initial and later stages of the war.
4. Attack on forces invading western Europe.
5. Oommand of the seas.
The Navy considered an unsupportable luxury all 
military weapons and activities which fail in time of 
peace to contribute the most to the attainment of 
these "first needs."^2
After thus limiting the initial offensive capabili­
ties of the Nation to a bloodletting la western Europe, the 
Navy explained the futility of strategic bombing capabili­
ties in meeting these objectives;
Strategic bombing . . . will not serve any of 
these requirements, for the giant, hlgh-altltude 
bomber cannot defend the United states, seize or 
hold advance bases, defend western Europe, 
effectively attack advancing troops in western 
Europe, or maintain control of the seas. . . .
Tactical air power rather than strategic air 
power, plus ground troops and sea power, are the 
only military instrumentalities that cam meet these
^%ous# Committee on Armed Services Report on 
Unification and Strategy, in Army and Navy Journal,
MeimStB c I T e l w  Soûsê^$%nK17Ication 
and Strategy Report*
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©lemeatary requirements. • . . The Nation is unwisely 
investing, in time of peace, substantial sums of .,
limited defense appropriations for strategic bombing. '
The ripping of the bellows♦ quite naturally, General 
Vendenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air foroe, was somewhat 
appalled by this rather extraordinary thesis of the Navy. 
Taking the sledge hammer of power out of the defense tool 
kit and leaving the Nation only with lesser nuances of power, 
desirable though the took and claw hammers were and are, did 
not appear to appeal to him at all. After quoting Winston 
Churchill as a somewhat qualified authority on the deterrent 
effect of the atomic bomb in contrast to the glib and posi­
tive young naval commander who had loosely correlated his 
facts as part of the navel effort to belittle atomic 
capabilities, Vandenberg listed some of the logical con­
sequences of the drastic change in strategic planning 
proposed by the Navy:
first, we would give up the deterrent value of 
this country’s atomic weapons and we would place our­
selves in disagreement with all of those people, on 
both sides of the ocean, who believe that Soviet 
aggression is, in fact, now being deterred.
Second, we would inform the Russians that they 
need now take no defensive measures against a possible 
atomic attack on their heartland. Much has been 
said here about an enej^ capability of stopping bomber 
attacks. . • . The people who have said these things 
seem not to realise that the 1-36»s, 1-47»s, and 
1-50*8, by merely existing, can, and do, force the 
soviet Onion to channel its industrial power, tech­
nological skill, manpower, and money into purely 
defensive measures and thus out down resources which 
could otherwise be devoted to offensive purposes.
^loe# cit.
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Third, if war is forcad upon us, this proposal 
deprives us of the opportunity of choking off enemy 
war-making power at its souree. It bring# it about 
that the enemy*# weapons have to be met and destroyed 
by our soldiers and tactical airmen while these weapons 
are shooting at them* It eliminates the possibility 
of destroying these weapons in the production stage 
before they can shoot.
Mr. Chairman, this alternative is militarily 
unsound. A prime objective of this country must be
to find a counterbalance to the potential enemy’s 
masses of ground troops other than equal masses of 
American and Allied ground troops. No such balanc­
ing factor exists other than strategic bombing, includ­
ing the atomic bomb. Only by that method can those 
masses of ground troops be weakened at the source of 
hostile military power.
Lest this statement be again tortured into a 
declaration that strategic bombardment can win a 
war alone, let me restate my belief that if a future 
war comes ultimately it must be concluded on the 
ground, like most wars of iHe past, ^uf iT’is Ihe 
objective of the strategic bombardment program— an 
objective that has been proved in battle— so to 
weaken the sustaining sources of enemy troops that they 
can be defeated in less time at less cost.17
The question of filling the defense tool kit was 
certainly not solved by Vandenberg’s remarks, but the naval 
strategy did appear the weaker of the two concepts, provid­
ing balanced forces, tailor-made for best maintaining world 
stability, could not be provided. Perhaps General Bradley, 
the doughboy and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, 
had a better concept of what should be the goal of team 
play among all the armed forces when he warned:
There is a Sunday afternoon within the memory 
of all of us when this country was without the means 
of striking back from a devastating blow. Nothing 
stood between us and fiendish foe but an entirely
^^House 1949 Strategy Hearings, 454-457» Italics 
not in original.
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Inadequate Air Foroe, a mere handful of Regular 
eoldlera plus a few olTlllan oomponent* celled 
into Federal aervloe a year before, and the remnants
of what we had considered to be a powerful Eavy.
Never again should this Nation face such a 
catastrophe.
Nor must we allow those friendly nations rely- 
ing upon us for support to place their confidence in 
vain,
Americans must never forget the lessons we 
learned on that Sunday afternoon,
we would have welcomed then the power to strike 
back in retaliation. Had we been capable of retaliat­
ing in kind, we could have saved the lives of many 
American youth. It would have made no difference 
to us then which of the armed forces was capable of 
carrying out this job,
probably complete understanding, cooperation, and 
mutual trust could have avoided that fatal day. But 
it, and the subsequent lessons we learned, day by 
day, until September 194f», should have taught all 
military men Lhat our military forces are one team—  
in the game to win regardless of who carries the ball. 
This is no time for "fancy dans" who won’t hit the 
line with all they have on every play, unless they 
can call the signals, Each player on this team—  
whether he shines in the spotlight of the backfield 
or eats dirt in the line— must be an all-American,^^
This splendid picture of the objectives unification
could not attain with the means provided, was dimmed by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, when he added, in
rightful Indignation of the MacArthurian conduct of the Navy;
I believe that the public hearing of the griev­
ances of a few officers who will not accept the 
decision# of the authorities established by law, end 
■ cS££âfâ «  |£ °S£. i|2£ state of PfePeredpesg. Wee done Infinite harm toour national defense,our posi­
tion of leadership in world affairs, the position of 
our national policy, and the confidence of the people 
in their Government,
In my opinion, the armed forces all have.a very 
big job to do, end we should get on with it.*"
l*Ibid.. 536.
l^Ibid.. 536-537. Italics not in original.
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PoGslbly Bra&ley waa trying to fool th@ Soviet 
ipalon aa to the deplorable atate of th* Nation's defenses, 
ehleh had been nakedly exposed by the hearings, but along 
with either this naive estimate of soviet Intelligence 
capabilities or loyalty to his civilian superiors, who sere 
doing their best to confirm the desire of Congress for the 
Hoover concept of economy, he also apparently convinced 
Chairman Vinson that Congress was fulfilling Its responsi­
bilities to the Nation In supporting adequate defenses, in 
a well-deserved tribute to Bradley, Tlnson repeated the 
assurance that all was well;
General Bradley, In my opinion you have again 
rendered great service to your Nation. This la a force­
ful document— a powerful document. I am satisfied 
that It will help this oommlttee to clear up the 
atmosphere— to get the chaff out of the wheat, and 
to reach a right and proper decision. I think you 
have lifted much of the mist over this serious situa­
tion and have let the country know that we do have 
a strong and powerful defense organization, manned 
by qualified and competent people. I thank you.*®
famished evidence compounded by the Great gngineer. 
Except for Marshall's veiled remarks, cited earlier, about 
the futility of balanced military forces due to the collec- 
tlve guilt of the American people of expecting strength 
without sacrifice, the hearings were completely devoid of 
a constructive facing of the two brutal facts that first, 
within the limits of Congressional appropriations for defense, 
none of the armed forces could do its minimum job as part of
537.
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a single team in assisting world stability, and second, even 
the prime deterrent, sir power, had not only grievous limi­
tations but had also been hamstrung in effectiveness due to 
limited means, even with proper emphasis on its stellar role 
in the air age*
Nevertheless, these hearings during two fateful 
weeks of October, 1949» little over half a year from a minor 
test of the Nation*s total defenses against aggression,
Korea, provided all the evidence available to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and Forrests! a year earlier. The dilemma was 
equally clear now. Perhaps Congress, having the basic 
responsibility for the quandary, could now produce the 
miracle, strength without sacrifice, or then again, perhaps 
Congress could only do what the best professional experts 
could do in the past and what Representative Lansdale 
Sasscer, Democrat of Maryland, had dimly foreseen before the 
October hearings got under way. Among other things, particu­
larly his constituents, Sasecer was worried about what 
Congress was doing in providing armed forces like;
. . .  .a football team developing a strong quarter­
back who takes shoes away from the halfback and 
pants off the blocking back, and the whole basic 
thing is out of line. * . . .
For some rather human reason, probably the seme one that
made the Army the only strong post-world war II advocate of
üniversai Military Training, and American youth desire either
21House 1949 B-36 Investigation, 664.
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to serve In safety or to die with glamour, the Congressman 
ahowed proper solicitude for the Air Force, the Navy, and 
the Marine Corps, hut bis short-handed haokfleld also looked 
unusual and lonesome without a line.
Fruitlessly, the hearings, with their gruesome 
portents of disaster, droned to a close on 21 October 1949 
Twith a happy note of cheer, beloved by all Congressmen.
Herbert Hoover concluded the hearings with his usual stirring 
call for trenchant action, like pulling the covers over his 
heed, and forcefully demanded economy as the fighting edge 
of the Natlon*a armed forces. In praising Secretary Johnson** 
vigorous scalpel on the Inevitable fat, which unfortunately, 
in this case had little muscle under It, Hoover defended 
administrative outs of defense monies already appropriated 
by Congress. Absurdly, In some Instances, such as providing 
for Impotently pllotless planes that would become obsolete 
due to other fund limitations before pilot cadres could be 
trained to fly them In an «aergency. Congress had laid Itself 
wide open to this accusation by Hoover:
One phase of this economy problem Is the Idea 
which has been advanced that administrative officers 
should spend the full appropriations of the Congress.
This may well apply to some special desire of the 
Congress, but It should not be a general rule.
Otherwise the whole purpose of congressional legls- 
latlon for economy, such as arose from our committee, 
of which I was chairman, would fall to the ground as 
absolutely futile, so that In my view Secretary 
Johnson has outlined to you the proper organization 
to be set up on the economy front. It is. In It­
self, evidence of his resolution to bring about 
these economies; and, as your committee well knows, 
making economies In government receives very little
-103"
praise from the great majority th%t benefit. They do evoke great disharmonies from those who ere dlrootly affected; and, for this determination and the Secretary's willingness to take this punishment, he Is doing a real public service.I would like to add one more thought, and that Is to emphasize the pressures which now erlst upon our economy. It Is costing us. In one direction or another, almost 24 billion dollars annually to carry on the cold war. Already we have a budget deficit In sight of 5 or 6 billion dollars for this fiscal year and perhaps more next year. That can mean. If It continues, only one thing, and that Is Inflation, which will damage every worker and every farmer In the United States. In my view our productive economy Is already so heavily taxed as to slow up progress In Its Improvement of methods and the necessary expansion to meet the needs and demands of our Increasing popu­lation. Ro cannot continue such burdens forever, and the first service is economy.Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To which the gallant gentleman from Georgia, Carl 
Vinson, Southern Democrat, nostalgic for the happy defla­
tionary days of less than two decades before, replied with 
joyous courtesy at thie answer to all of his committee's 
problems:
Thank you, Mr, President. Tour statement will be of great value to the oommlttee, I am particularly anxious to have you give to the committee your views, for In writing our report I wanted your sound judgnumt to be a guide to assist us.It la a pleasure, Mr. President, to have you here.I hope our request hasn't unduly Inconvenienced you.*̂
lot to be outdone in compliments, and in fitting 
display of just the right degree of modesty to a well-deserved 
tribute, the sage of Palo /dto and the Waldorf Towers (where 
at that time he dwelled in solitary grandeur without the com­
plementing glory of the military henchman of his administration.
^%ouse 1949 Strategy Hearings, 638.
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Douglae MacArthur) aould only reply, amid a etandlng ovatloa, 
»It la a greet pleaaure to hare been of help, and It ia the 
duty of every citizen to ooeie ehen the oommlttee aeke."̂ ^
Indeed, all the evidence was now in, and, as the 
applause slowly faded away for the elder statesman, the court*
ly (Georgian, as usual having the last word, repeated, ŵ hank
25you, Mr. President." Then, with all the problems of our 
troublous modern world miraculously washed away, with all 
sense of urgency completely vanished, and with the ratio of 
American atomic superiority diminishing, Vinson owtinued:
Members of the committee, that finishes ail of the witnesses scheduled by the committee to be heard.
HOW I think the proper thing for us to do Is to take all this testiittony that has been delivered and read it, study It, evaluate it, go home and rest, take a little vacation, get In touch with our constituency, come back here In January, and try to reach a decision as to what the course of action we think is important.
I want to say before we leave that Mr. Johnson, the Secretary of Defense, as stated by President Hoover, deserves the full support of the committee and the country in his difficult task.I think as I suggested a moment ago, when we know each other a little bit better— tuat Is, the Congress and the Defense Department and the various services— a great many of our difficulties will fade away.Members of the oommlttee, we will take a recess until the 3d day of January,
God bless you all.
^̂*Loo. olt. .'——I
^^Loc. olt.
^°Ibld., 636-639.
CHAPTER VII 
THE BIASED JDDOmHT
We are tailoring our defense to fit today* a 
situation. We are converting fat to muscle.—
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson!
&&%&! ama m&m mkzi naem* This
concluding statement of confidence in Louis Johnson by the 
House Committee on A%%ed Services, after substituting for the 
National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
pondering the Nation* e military problems, might have been 
expected to irrevocably bar the Navy from further major im­
portance in security osnsultations. The half-baked design 
of the Navy to take over an unwarranted share of the Nation’s 
meager defense establishment had been shot full of holes, not 
only by preponderant military evidence, but by the even more 
pressing political necessity for short-sifted economy.
Still the door, which the Navy had feared was closing 
on it for over a year, opened wide again in less than a week 
after the end of the committee hearings. Instead of approach­
ing an impossible solution to the defense problems based 
solely on the evidence of testimony, the committee added the
fêax-im-âlj: E s m  i? June 1950.
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element of violent pertisan emotion and aymjpathy for the 
Navy oauaed by the removal of Admiral Denfield a# Chief of 
Naval Operation* on 27 October 194#. Hi* relief occurred 
on Navy Day, formerly a happy naval holiday, but now of­
ficially abandoned due to an earlier edict by Louie Johneon.2 
%lB poorly timed action was a necessary administrative and 
personnel change for the best interests of harmony, efficiency, 
and sound judgment in the top military councils of the Nation, 
and not a reprisal for Denfield** partisan naval testimony 
before the House Committee on Armed Services. However, obvi­
ously, as in the case of the later MacArthur incident, Congress 
did not unanimously support this view.
The relief of Admiral Denfield, Which included the 
offer to him of any other four star billet in the Navy, re­
ceived every shade of opinion in the Congress. Representa­
tive Edward Hebert, Democrat from Louisiana, indicated that 
Chairman Vinson had been insulted. Senator^ Kenne^Wherry, 
Republican of Nebraska, thought the action necessary to re­
store order. Representative Paul Kilday from fesas felt the 
move restored civilian control of the armed forces and 
another Democrat, Representative Carl Durham of North Caro­
lina, stated that the removal was justified for maintaining 
cooperation in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.^
In full recognition of the political significance of
2News item in Army and Navy Journal, 29 Octob er 1949*
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the ouster, the Navy was jubilant. Crowd# of bluejackets 
thronged around Louis Denfield*# home on Observatory Hill 
and cried, "Denfield for P r e s i d e n t and "Hurrah for Oncle 
L o u i e . Louie, in his cloak of martyrdom, was alleged to 
reply:
The Navy is bigger than anything else or any 
individual. The Navy will carry on and I will do
my part to help the Navy and the country. I will 
step down if it will do that.5
However, the crux of this controversy between the 
Executive branch and the majority of Carl Vinson* s committee 
warn expressed by the opposing opinions of Johnson and the 
Ceorglan. The Secretary of Defense insisted that he had up­
held the previous commitments made to Vinson about no re­
prisals, but:
This is not to say, of course, that there will 
not be some changes in assignments within the De­
partment of Defense. Such changes will occur
continw)ualy, whenever any individuals show them­
selves tollsck the qualifications for jobs to which 
they have been assigned, and as other individuals 
show themselves to possess the necessary qualifi­
cations.*
In rebuttal, the strong man from the South replied, in part:
Admiral Denfield has been made to walk the plank 
for having testified before the Armed Services Com­
mittee #at the Navy is not being consulted as to its 
functions, that the Navy*# roles and missions are 
being altered, that the Naval air arm is being fwced 
into a state of weakness and that the Navy is not 
accepted in the full partnership in the national 
defense structure.
^&oC' SM* 
alt'
*Ibid.. ) November 1949.
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The security of the nation demands that re­
sponsible military men at all times be free to 
give to the Congress and the country the trw 
state of affairs as they see it in the armed 
services, even though their views run counter 
to that of the civilian heads and in conseqwnce 
of having done so there should be no reprisals.
Secretary Matthews at the very outset of the 
hearing publicly stated that all naval witnesses 
were free to state their views and now Admiral 
Denfield is made to pay the price for having done 
so.
The Congress nor the committee cannot sit 
quietly by and permit reprisal against witnesses 
who have testified before it.
Suffice it to say that this reprisal against 
Admiral Denfield for having painted the picture 
as he sees it in the Navy will be dealt with in 
the committee* s report and on the floor of the 
House in January.7
Vinson*s eulogy of Secretary Johnson on the conclud­
ing day of the unification and strategy hearings bad become 
dim indeed in the minds of a majority of the committee 
members.
Coagressional quandary substituted for military 
dilemma. Without proper cognizance of the restrictions of 
economy, which had created all this chaos in the military 
establishment, the House krmd Services Committee, of course, 
had no better success than Forrestal and the Joint Chiefs of 
gtaff, or the Johnson regime, in resolving the dilemma—  
strength without sacrifice. Now, with an emotional bias 
added, the confusion could be only compounded, fruitless, 
indeed, as a further effort to evaluate the position of the 
Navy on defense, would be a detailed critique and analysis
7jUoc. citf.
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of the final report of the committee concerning unification 
and strategy. This report was finally released to the public 
in early March X9$€^ less than four months before the Korean 
incident provided a minor test of the defense machinery and 
means so ill-provided by the Congress. However, if allowance 
is made for the bias caused by the alleged Executive affront 
of the Denfield removal to the delicate sensibilities of the 
Congress, the findings of the committee, as listed in the 
report, do provide a useful summary and commentary on how the 
vision of the previous statesmanlike military position of the 
Navy had degmerated in 1949 during the naval quest for a 
bigger slice of limited defense funds.
For this purpose, therefore, certain findings of the 
report, applicable to the position of the Navy between World 
War II and the Korean incident of 1950, have been extracted, 
with further examination and comment interpolated. Among the 
coaœittee findings were, first:
In view of the terrible destructiveness of 
modern weapons, the Nation can no longer afford 
lackadaisical planning or complacency as to its 
defenses. For an indefinite time, the Nation 
must maintain sound, modern, alert defensive 
forces capable of anticipating dnd dealing with 
a sudden enemy attack.9
This is an adequate statement of a rather negative 
end for the use of force, but nowhere in the committee report.
^Bouse 1950 Unification and Strategy Report. 
Git.
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as might be ezpeeted, were the aecessary means to even this 
limited e W  reeommended. Acceptanoe In advance of the re­
verse cutting edge of the Hoover concept of economy had, of 
course, doomed any real solution to the defense problem.
The Mavy did not at any time endanger its numerous friend­
ships on Capitol Hill, by advocating more total means, and, 
in 1949* advocated only more naval means.
Another committee finding was;
Intercontinental strategic bombing is not
synonymous with the Ration* s military air power.
Military air power consists of Air force, Navy, 
and Marine Corps air power, and of this, strategic 
bombing is but one phase. The national air power 
consists of the military air power of the various 
services plus commercial aviation plus the national 
industrial and manpower resources pertaining to 
aviation.
Navy leaders are not opposed to *strategic air 
warfare" but do oppose "strategic bombing" if, by 
the term "strategic bombing," is meant mass aerial 
boiB^ardment of urban areas.
Difficulties between the Air force and the 
naval air arm will continue because of fundamental 
professioiml disagreements on the art of warfare.
Service prejudices, jealousies, and thirst for 
power and recognition have had only a bare minimim of influence on this mntroversy.lO
Originally, the Navy had made most coimendable efforts 
to put air power into proper focus and perspective as part 
of the total power of the Nation, in contrast to the Air 
force with their vociferous protagonists of the wishful 
propaganda of cheap, easy military security. The Navy had 
quite properly held that only balanced forces could apply
“ i2£- £ii-
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the proper degree of military coercion required by specific 
situations I which would permit a maximum of stability in 
human affairs before, during, and after the requirement for 
physical restraint arose. Nevertheless, contrary to the 
committee opinion, in 1949, during an avaricious attempt to 
get adequate naval means instead of adequate, or at least the 
best, total means, the Navy abused its objective of balanced 
forces into an unbalance requiring an unwarranted deprecia­
tion of the sledge hammer of power— the atomic, biological, 
and chemical air offensive.
Strangely, although the Army had quietly, and the 
Karine Corps had vociferously, mentioned the ground soldier 
as a part of the total fighting team of the Nation, the com­
mittee, even at this late date, noted land forces only by 
indirection, the citing of the doughboy* a most powerful 
weapon, tactical aircraft, almost as an aside:
A closer relationship should be established be­
tween Marine Corps aviators, the Army Field Forces, 
and the Air Force for the development of sound close 
air support tactic s and techniques. The Secretary 
of Defense should require the prompt establishment 
of a joint training center for this purpose.
There should be joint training activities between 
tactical aircraft of the Air Force and Navy to re­
solve questions of relative performance of these 
aircraft.11
In this field the Navy had never let its eye off the ball, 
for which the Nation can be duly fateful.
Almost forgetful of the Cedric Worth ease and
llJLoc. cit.
-112"
obliYious of the futility is attempt lug to resolve the 
numerous intangibles of opinion on the relative merit of 
offensive and defensive weapons without a real enemy using 
radar, antiaircraft guns, and filters with ball ammunition 
instead of cameras, the committee blithely said of the 
touchiest Savy-Air Force mental joust*
There is no justification whatsoever for barring 
naval aviation personnel from Strategic Air Command 
activities of the Air Force. This is not in the 
spirit of unification, despite the provocations that 
may have occurred in the past to produce this situ­
ation.
There should be an augmentation of interserriee 
war games to resolve such questions as the Banshee 
versus the B-36 in order to eliminate or at least
reduce the tensions between the services, as wall 
as contributing to their combat readiness.12
The Wavy provocation had indeed been great, but the 
Air Force provocation had probably been even greater over a 
longer period of time. However, this Mart balm to the Navy 
was not followed by the physical ointment of money, in spite 
of the mmmittee* s tender words of sympathy:
The committee deplores the manner of cancel­
lation of the construction of the aircraft carrier 
H3S United States, but, because of the pressure of 
other shipbuilding programs at the present time and 
the existing budgetary limitations on the Navy De­
partment, will withhold further action— for the 
present— as regards the construction of this vessel.
The committee consider it sound policy, however, for 
the Nation to follow the advice of its professional 
leaders in regard to this subject in the same manner 
as has been heretofore done in respect to the B-36 
bomber. In the committee* s view, the Nation*s 
leaders in respect to naval weapons are the leaders
1%0G. cit.
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of the Waited States Navy,13
there it was, big and bold at last, the question of 
money. Nevertheless, the oommlttee, in spite of its kind 
solicitude for the Navy, had properly, for the time being, 
left the Navy naked of offensive air weapons of advanced 
design, whereas the Air Force did have its B-36, albeit in 
small numbers. Even the element of sympathy, leaving the 
door open to the Navy in the legislative halls, brought only 
words, not weapons, and the promises of corrective legisla­
tion, not yet realised, to restore the ego of the naval 
establishment, This further hope for the Navy, still being 
pushed by Navy and Marine idolaters on Capitol Hill, was 
demonstrated by*
The Joint Chiefs of Staff structure, as now 
constituted, does not Insure at all times adequate 
consideration for the views of all services. The 
committee will sponsor legislation to require ro­
tation of the position of chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff among the services after a 2-year 
term, and to add the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a member thereof.14
On this conclusion, the committee departed from reality 
with its hope that irreconcilable differences could be re­
solved by four service representatives better than with three, 
even with the rotating neutrality of their chairman assured. 
However, no one could find fault with the following succinct 
comment on post-World War ll unification progress* "All
13loc. cjŷ.
14l o c. cit.
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#@rvlc@# have bees at fault at on# time or another in the 
unification effort, there are no unification Puritan# in 
the Pentagon,
Hevertheless, the House Committee on Ar##d Services 
had dona fully as well as Secretary of Defense Porrestal, 
his successor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in solving the 
quandary of strength without sacrifice. With unjustified 
modesty, the committee summarised the goal of defense without 
citing the means necessary:
A political body cannot of itself reach, through 
deliberative processes, final answers on profes­
sional military questions but must depend upon and 
encourage a continuation of the process of explora­
tion, study, and coordination among our officers of 
the several services to preserve a satisfactory 
doctrine of defense, to have ready applicable plans, 
and to devise units, suitably equipped, to meet the 
most probable circumstances of any emergency. The 
significant thing is to insure that the national 
defense structure Insures adequate consideration of 
all professional views, especially during these 
early days of unification.**
Here again was vindication of the view, held by the 
Wavy from the start of unification clamor, that the role of 
the senior military specialists from each service, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, should be confined to staff planning and 
recommendations, with minority views fully expressed, if the 
civilian Commander in Chief, the President, and his deputy 
in defense matters, the Secretary of Defense, were to use 
this advice properly in preserving civilian control of the
ISloc. cit.
l% o c . cit.
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final complex dacision» required in the military ##tabll*h- 
ment. The fact that the Armed Services Committee itself 
could not provide these decisions and answers "to meet the 
most probable circumstances of any emergency" certainly re­
quired no apology because the best civilian and military 
experts in the Defense Department had also failed due to in­
superable limitations on military spending. If the Navy, 
as well as the other services, had been able to perform ade­
quately the missions assigned to them under unification, the 
quarrel over how bestto meet future emergencies would not 
have arisen. Only this can provide any extenuation for the 
deplorable flaunting of constituted civilian authority that 
the Navy demonstrated by going directly to Congress over the 
heads of its civil superiors.
Two weeks after the House Committee on Aimed Services 
released its findings, General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, told the Senate Appropriations Committee in 
closed session a little more about the basic dilemma. On 
15 March 1950, in testimony defending the Fiscal Tear 1951 
appropriations request of the Department of Defense for thir­
teen billion dollars, the Hoover spending goal mow reached by 
Secretary Johnson, Bradley hinted at the difference between 
means and requirements when he noted that a thirty or forty 
billion dollar defense budget would be excessive due to the 
danger of spoiling the American industrial potential tbrou# 
economic collapse. However, he added that, if the United 
States could spend three hundred billion dollars In winning
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World War II, he would not gag at spending on a leaser scale 
in trying to win the peace. This veiled warning had an un­
pleasant monetary ring. Secretary Johnson was s»re musical 
to the Congressional ears when he said, in |»rt, "We are 
tailoring our defense to fit today* s situation. We are con­
verting fat to muscle."1? These sinews of war, just describ­
ed by Secretary of Defense Johnson in March 19)0 before the 
closed Senate hearing, were exposed in the same glowing terms 
under an ominous date line f w  public release, 17 June 1950, 
one week before the Korean Incident.
17Army-Navy Air Force Journal, 17 June 1950. 
l̂ loc. cit.
GHAPTBR VIII 
AFTERMATH AND RETROSPECT
. . .  we still have with us, in what is obviously 
a very acute form, the problem of the machinery for 
decision-making and for the implementation of policy 
in our government* . . Ambassad«H* George F. Kennanl
Afterlight sheds m  S12£ SliâSaü* Shortly, these 
allegedly tailored defense needs did not seem to quite fit 
the American defense posture required by purportedly changing 
times. Two years after the period covered by this study, in 
May 1952, Bradley testified before the same Senate Committee. 
He now begged the Senate to restore the rate of spending from 
forty-six billion dollars imposed by the House of Representa­
tives to the fifty-two billion dollars already committed in 
firm contracts and troop basis by the Department of Defense 
for fiscal Tear 1953 from previously approved Congressional 
appropriations. The power of the Congressional purse over 
the defense sword was still apparent, yet for some reason 
the goals of each had multiplied since 1950. Correctly, how­
ever, Bradley did not attribute the need for this increased 
level of preparedness to the finor diversion of Korea, which 
was only directly devouring one tenth of the defense budget,
^Kennao, 94.
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but rather to palpable facts of actual and foreseeable rela­
tive military power that had been obvious since September 
1949» and accurately estimated before then, dependent on the 
Soviet Union’s proved Initial atomic disclosure. If Brad­
ley’s facts, known In 1949»? were still correct In 1952, then 
the rate of defense expenditure planned for the early period 
of the Korean War and the actual rate occurring during this 
war should have been approximately equal.
As before Korea, 1954 remained the approximate date 
for the greatest danger of Soviet willingness to risk total 
war. Still, Bradley alleged the rate of spending to be too 
low In spite of the added Incentive given American armament 
by emotional disturbance over a minor Incident on the Soviet 
periphery. This affair was little more disturbing than the 
older Asian Incidents of IWo-Ghlna and Malaya, or even 
Greece, except that for the first time the alleged spontaneity 
of indigenous uprisings was dimmed by American blood and the 
more overt preplanning, training, and employment of rebels 
and their volunteer supporters as regular troop units based 
and formed on areas within Soviet control. The American ex­
aggeration of reality In Korea reached proper proportions 
when compared to the greedy amw of the automobile, as many 
discovered long before a purported Presidential blunder de­
preciating the value of battlefield compared to accidental 
carnage. Both types of bloodshed were deplorable, but even 
more despicable was the self-Imposition of conditions for
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futur# sXaughter or slavery so openly extended by the United 
States and the West before the Korean War.
Even after two years of corrective action spent pre­
sumably In withdrawing this Invitation of weakness, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff bad to call attention 
to obvious deficiencies In the sacrifice of Americans, who 
were still Ignoring la 1952, as Bradley Indicated, In part, 
the realities of 1949 In their forecasts for 1914, or earlier*
If you would like a relative timetable, con­
sider our own atomic capabilities betwemn 1945, 
wMo we held the first test explosion In the New 
Mexico desert, and five years later In 1950,
With all the knowledge that she has gained,
Soviet progress should be faster than our own 
progress in our first five year period,%
This dwindling ratio of American atomic superiority, 
which was clearly declining from a presumed Infinity In 1949 
to a ratio approaching the relative rates of production, 
would soon provide only an inconsequential differential due 
to greater American vulnerability in atomic targets and also 
due to total destruction once accomplished not being worth 
multiplying. With even less encouragement, Bradley and other 
defense officials testified in May 1952 about continuing 
Soviet superiority in most other fields of post-World War II 
military capabilities. Including military stockpiling and 
arms production. Even qualitative air superiority was fol­
lowing the loss of quantitative supremacy. Only in surface 
fleets and their accompanying aircraft did America temporarily
^.Army-iavy-Air Force Journal. 10 May 1952.
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predominate in spite of submarine threats.%
Here, at least, was one weapon the Soviet# eould not 
match as yet, in spite of previous efforts on the part of 
elements within the American military establishment to rid 
the Nation of one clear-cut advantage of the sea-turtle over 
the land-tortoise, namely, intercontinental mobility of mass­
es, which air power alone probably can never provide. Mahan 
might have died, and the similar unilateral concept of power 
rewritten by Douhet might also be dead, but as Millie, their 
sage destroyer implies, unitary military power may well live 
forever, at least so long as there is life, and now appears 
to be the one last hope of life, barring an unexpected millen­
ium of reason. In die perhaps wishful thought that some may 
read the lesson, Mlllis writes:
lores wrote the lesson plain. The policy of 
containment requires, for success, a military arm; 
that arm must be based on ground troops, available 
to mntrol the actual {rather than the future hypo­
thetical} situations which Communist expansion is 
constantly creating. In a context which is ^obal, 
these ground troops must have the mobility which 
can be conferred only by control of the sea routes; 
they must also have the fullest possible support of 
tactical aviation, as well as whatever assistance 
may be lent, under specific cKinditiens, by longer- 
range, ’♦strategic’* air war. The whole must be 
operated as a team, making optimum use of each 
available element in accordance with the circum­
stances presented. . . .  In actual warfare, missions 
are dictated, not by service politics, but by com­bat conditions,4
The price of containment came high and demanded a 
3loc. cit.
4walter Mills, "Sea Power: Abstraction or Asset?"
JEaialp MiâlEE» fork, aprll 1951, sited in full by tarv leview. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 1952, i.
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ready, fall tool kit from the aledge hammer of strategic air 
power to the military policeman’s blackjack, just as the 
Navy had originally insisted before the Nation’s overweening 
emphasis on strategic air power and strength without sacri­
fice had warped the naval judgment. Bradley also fully agreed 
at this late date in May 1952, when a politically tenable 
position on defense by his civilian superiors now permitted 
a stand for the expense of balanced forces. In his conclud­
ing remarks to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Bradley 
begged again for the money to help buy back the lost years 
before 1949 when Soviet ascendancy in versatile military 
force had been gained:
In the realm of national security, there is 
one precious commodity on sale today, especially 
for the Waited States, because we have the price 
to buy it* ’’time.” Next year and in succeeding 
years the price will be higher and there will be 
less "time” we can purchase. If we are allowed 
any time for preparedness after the next two car 
three years, I think we will be lucky. If we 
make proper use of the time that is allowed us 
to strengthen our forces, we can build a deter­
rent that the Soviet Union may respect, and we 
may avoid having a war at all. As an American 
citisen I believe it is very foolish for us not 
to make the best use of the time we have.5
Even this cheery bit of optimism was colored by a 
more pessimistic current estimate that Bradley made, a perti­
nent portion of which was, ”In fact, today’s estimates give 
the Soviet Union a capability which she may well consider as 
adequate to warrant the risk of a major aggression now. ”6
M m  iSMBSàf 10 May 1952.
^Loc. ci%.
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Brmdley did not state what the relative power position of 
the United States would have been if it were not for the 
Korean incentive to sacrifice, nor did he account for the 
lost years before Korea. This explanation could not be made 
in good taste by an Executive spokesman as an official remark 
pointing, as it must, to the collective guilt of the American 
people, which General Marshall had discreetly indicated some 
three years before in 1949# as the supreme deterrent to an 
adequate defensive posture of the United States in peace time.
In spite of the futility of informed voices crying 
from the depths of the American wilderness to place reality 
above visions of noxmlcy, political and military leaders still 
have responsibility for informing the led. The Navy, however, 
did not stand alone among the professional military in failing 
to produce leaders with the strength of character to advocate 
paying the price required for balanced forces, instead of 
merely paying lip service to the price that the traffic of 
public opinion would bear. Such leaders of stature rarely 
occur in a democracy, but, when they do, they should gladly 
forfeit power and position in order to be heard without the 
stigma of disloyalty. The effort might be fruitless, but 
nevertheless should be made. Unfortunately, the example of 
the MacArthurs, Denfields, and Crosmelins leaves little of 
the heroic to emulate because these insurgents, right or 
wrong, debased even the improbable validity of their posi­
tions under the tawdry tarnish of disloyalty before their
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meveranGe from their mastere.
Historical lessons ignored. Politics is the art of 
the possible, and political life is short, but political 
leaders are in a far better position than the professional 
military to be heard on defease matters, even if divergence 
from public opinion brings tei^orary or permanent electoral 
defeat, because their motives are not suspected of profes­
sional bias and bureaucratic aggrandisement for the armed 
forces. Although the record in the Baited States after 
World War II will probably hever be made so frankly and 
devastatingly clear, an apparent analogy exists in British 
experience, during the period of German rearmament before 
World War II, of comparable trials in leading a democracy 
into sacrifice. Bnfortunately, the United States has yet to 
produce an effective conscience and professionally qualified 
inquisitor like Churchill and the self-damning frankness of 
Baldwin, confidently arrogant with overwhelming executive 
and legislative power, to bring the harsh light of day on 
political realities. An interchange between Churchill and 
Baldwin on 12 November 1936, however, serves to bring the 
basic dilemma of the United States after World War II into 
sharper focus, ^hurchill reports himself as castigating 
Baldwin in the House of Comwns, for failing to keep his 
pledge, made before the general election of October 1935» to 
maintain British air parity with Germany, with these ex­
cerpts;
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Tb# Qov«rnffiôïiti 6Imply cannot make up their 
minds» or they cannot get the Prime Minister to 
make up his mind. So they go on in strange paradox, 
decided only to be undecided, resolved to be ir­
resolute, adamant for drifts solid for fluidity, 
all-powerful to be impotent. So we go on preparing 
more months and years— precious, perhaps vital to 
the greatness of Britain— for the locusts to eat.7
With frighteningly honest candor Baldwin replied in 
part, with emphasis added by Churchill’s later italics:
1 would remind the House that not once but on 
many occasions in speeches and in various places, 
when I have been speaking and advocating as far as 
I am able the democratic principle, I have stated
ttat a iQasrasî ia i|m p  aa ipsidictator. I believe that to be t r u e . It has been 
true in this case. lou will remember the election
•mtkeü m m  mm E S  IfiEià,mx®arnommm msSïm*sition a* the leader of a great party was not alto­
gether a comfortable one. I asked myself what chance 
was there— when that feeling that irais given expres­
sion to in Fulham was common throughout the country—  
what chance was there within the next year or two of 
that feeling being so changed that the country would 
give a mandate for reaxmament? Supposing I had ^ne 
to the ^untry and said that Qexmany was rearming, 
and that we must rearm, does anybody think that this 
specific deomieraey would have rallied to that cry at 
that moment? I cannot think of anything that would
ma! miÊ
Â8 a loyal member of the Conservative party, Churchill 
tried to put Baldwin’s actions into the most favorable light 
possible, when viewed against the background of Socialist
opposition. Still, Churchill could only conclude;
This was indeed appalling frankness. It carried
naked truth about his motives into indecency. That 
a Prime Minister should avow that he had not done
âilàflllBS S&SEË, 215.
^Ibld.. 216.
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his duty iii regard to national safety because he 
was afraid of losing the election was an incident 
without parallel in our parliamentary history.
Mr. Baldwin was, of course, not moved by any ig­
noble wish to remain in office. He was in fact 
in 1936 earnestly desirous of retiring. His 
policy was dictated by the fear that if the So­
cialists came into power, evm less would be done 
than his Government Intended, All their declara­
tions and votes against the defense measures are 
upon the record. But this was no complete defeme, 
and less than justice to the spirit of the British 
people. . . .9
Never has the negative power of the opposition party 
in a democracy been more clearly indicated than in this 
tragedy of the 1930's portrayed by Churchill, and perhaps 
this power has only been equalled by the Republican Party of
the American post-World War II period, a time even more 
fraught with disaster. Only minor transposition of appropri­
ate dates, places, and names, particularly the substitution 
of *economy" and “slothful ease* for the "pacifism* described, 
is required above to indicate accurately the political milieu 
of America in the period covered by this study.
Churchill apparently felt, at least under the British 
parliamentary system with undivided concentration of both 
executive and legislative responsibility, unequivocally placed 
at the summit; that the leader of the party in power had a 
unique duty which could not be shirked. In contrast, the 
American system with its extreme diffusion of political power 
makes the responsibility of the leaders to the led less 
clear-cut. However, an excerpt from the Munich Times, which
9lbid.m 216-217,
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also caught Churchilleye in early 1936, takes a mere 
charitable view of the responsibility of leaders for the 
basic dilemma of a democracy in preparedness. It would be 
extremely naive to assume that Soviet intelligence has not, 
with at least equal perception, identified the dileima of 
the United States. Churchill cites the German estimate of 
the British, in part, as follows:
The English like a comfortable life compared 
with our German standards. This does not indeed 
mean that they are incapable of sustained efforts, 
but they avoid them so far as they can, without 
impairing their personal and national security.
They also control means and wealth idsich have en­
abled them, in contrast with us, for a century or 
30, to increase their capital more or less auto­
matically. After the war, in which the English 
after some preliminary hesitation showed certainly 
an amasing energy, the British masters of the world 
thought they had at last earned a little rest.
They disarmed along the whole lino— in civil life 
even more than on land and sea. For the land and 
air defence forces England needs above all men, 
not merely m»ney, but also the lives of her eiti- 
sens for Bapire defence. Mr. Baldwin himself said 
a short time ago that he had no intention of chang­
ing the system of recruiting by the introduction 
of conscription.
A policy which seeks to achieve success by 
postponing decisions can today hardly hope to re­
sist the whirlwind which is shaking Europe and in­
deed the #%ole world. Few are the men who, upon 
national and not upon party grounds, rage against 
the spinelessness and ambiguous attitude of the 
Government, ani hold them responsible for the dan­
gers into which the Bapire is being driven all 
unaware. The masses seem to agree with the Govern­
ment that the situation will improve by marking 
tiw, and that by means of small adjustments and 
carefully thought-out manoeuvres the balance can 
once again be rectified. But neither the power 
nor the courage to use force is at hand.10
To this Churchill could only add, «All this was only too
IGlbid.. 1#6-1#7, citina Meunchener Eeituna. 16 May
1936.
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true.MÜ An American today can make the same etatement with 
justice about the United States before Korea and perhaps 
even now*
This conclusion, however, leads us again to the thesis 
of collective guilt for such deliberate mischances In a 
democracy, particularly In the United States, where leader­
ship diffusion Is a hallowed fetish. Illhu loot, In dis­
cussing the requirements of a democracy la open participation 
of its people In foreign and military affairs, Insists on 
this view of collective responsibility and places a treman- 
dous portlonoof the accountability on the educational system, 
a system «hlch, also due to collective guilt, has palpably 
failed In its mission. As Eoot looked at the problem, some 
of his conclusions were;
The controlling democracy must acquire a 
knowledge of the fundamental and essential facts 
and principles upon which the relations of nations 
depend. Without such a knowledge there can be 
no intelligent discussion and consideration of 
foreign policy and diplomatic conduct. Misrepre­
sentation will have a clear field and Ignorance 
and error will make wild work with foreign rela­
tions. This is a point to which sincere people 
who are holding meetings and Issuing publications 
In opposition to war In general may well direct 
their attention if they wish to treat the cause 
of disease rather than the effects. That way Is 
to furnish the whole people, as a part of their 
ordinary education, with correct Information about 
their relations to other peoples, about the limita­
tions upon their own rights, about their duties to 
respect the rights of others, about what has hap­
pened and is happening In international affairs, 
and about the effects upon national life of the 
things that are done or refused as between nations;
lllbld., 187.
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90 that the people themselvea will have the means 
to test misinformation and appeals to prejudice 
and passion based upon e r r o r . 1 2
Root, among the l#st of a waning race from an earlier era of
towering Republican statesmen, thou#t this good advice In
1922. Standing in the afterlight, the stature of hl^ thought
becomes even more Imposing after the tarnish of years of
neglect is buffed away.
Earlier, Root had been even more foresighted in his 
demand for education on a broad basis for training our youth 
in all the responsibilities, duties, and privileges of free 
men. Root had positive views on complying with the second 
amendment of the Constitution, ratified in 1791, which states, 
"A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of 
a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed.* For carrying out this Constitutional 
mandate to reduce the influence of professional military men 
in political and economic affairs, Root suggested the simple 
and obvious device of returning military knowledge and power 
to the people— the only possible way, as the Swiss know, to 
reduce the burden of standing armed forces on the tax struc­
ture and on the democratic imy of life by providing an air 
and ground militia ready to fight overnight,With the
IBgiihu Root, *A Requisite for popular Diplomacy," 
Foreign Affairs. I, 15 September 1922, 4-5.
12"Report on the Army of a Neutral Country," L*Armee 
(Belgium), Ja» 
y 1951, 89-90/
la^Nation nuary, 1951, cited by Military Review.
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possible exceptions of his well-trained protege, Henry 
Stinson, and the Wilsonian, Newton Baker, former Secretary 
of War Root was the last civilian within the military estab­
lishment who capably dominated his professional helpers with­
out damaging the armed forces. Therefore, witb considerable 
authority Root wrote to a star-encrusted bit of brass, his 
formr Chief of Staff, the simple answer to improving further 
the fine American system of public, compulsory education;
Everyone i&o is fit to be a citisen of a free 
country ought to be willing to serve the country 
when called upon, in accordance with his ability.
The young men who are physically fit for military 
duty should hold themselves ready to fight for 
their country if need be, and if they are not ready 
when the need comes they will not long have any 
country, and they will not deserve to have any.
The vast change in the way of carrying on war which 
has occurred within a few years has created a situ­
ation in which it is perfectly plain that no coun­
try can be ready to defend her independence against 
foreign aggression except by universal military 
training and a resulting universal readiness for 
military service.14
Root might have added «civil defense," but then this was 1916,
when the military choices facing the Bolted States had not so
significantly narrowed. Only the Kaiser looked potentially
ominous then. In 1952, Congress was still wondering if
Stalin looked ominous, while the means for a ready militia
remained shelved on Capitol Hill.
The Navy could well join in the collective guilt of 
the Nation by failing to recognise adequately the significance
^ . Itailhu Boot. T&e, gi^ltasy &ad &f
||e^qnited Stages. 487, citing letter to S. B. M. Young,
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of this early solution of the Constitution, rediscovered by 
Root, to the problem of equal sacrifice in the post-World 
War II period. As a glamour service, the Navy, like the Air 
Force, has been notoriously derelict in her greedy skimming 
of the cream of volunteers and in a passive attitude about 
the universal training required for an effective ready mili­
tia and civil defense teams.
Root also deserved a Churchillian accolade for 
prescience at an even earlier date, over four decades before 
the naval squabbling of 1949. Here, too, the Navy, as well 
as the other components, should blush with shame on hearing 
these extracts from a speech delivered in 1908%
Settle your military questions within the limits 
of the military establishment. Never permit a 
controversy of any description to pass beyond the 
doors of the War oepartemnt. It is you udio are 
brou#t together to settle military questions. The 
people are generous to the army and proud of it.
Don't go to them with quarrels and expect them to 
settle them. Thrash these questions out, and then 
let the proper representative of the army, the 
Secretary of War, go to Congress with the results.
Nevor forget your duty of coordination with the 
other branches of the service— the naval, marine, 
and militia. This is the time to learn to serve to­
gether without friction.
Remember always that the highest duty of a soldier 
is self-abnegation. Campaigns have been lost for no 
other cause than the lack of that essential quality.
Keep dissension and jealousy out of the United States 
Army. Officers, you have no rights to rank and posi­
tion incompatible with the best interests of the 
service.
Do not cease to be citizens of the United States.
The conditions of ansy life are such qs to narrow 
your views. Strive to broaden your sympathies by 
mingling with those outside of the service and learn­
ing from them the things they can teach you. As you 
are good soldiers, be good citizens. Let our army 
be never one of aggression, but devoted to the
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interests of justice and peace.15 
Although the Spanish and Agulnaldo might not have been in 
wholehearted accord with the last statement of Root, never­
theless, these views appear to have much merit in their appli* 
cation to the post-World War II position of the Navy on uni­
fication and strategy, if only by contrast.
In another speech, now almost a half-century old.
Root seemed to have anticipated unification in its most de­
sirable form, one in which the Navy could also take much 
pride due to its post-World War II efforts under Forrestal’s 
tutelage. After a most tragic display of how not to fight a 
war in 189&, the Army bad finally been forced into a modicum 
of unification by Root* a inauguration of an infant, and sobmi- 
what powerless, general staff in 1903. With a sad reminder 
of the evils of too much compartment ali sat ion, but with a 
realistic approach to the gradualness for which Forrestal 
later fought to assure a complete appreciation of all views 
among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Root joined the great com­
promiser across the years in sayings
Many another officer has studied and striven 
and written and appealed in vain for improvements 
in the military service, and has passed away, and 
he and his work have been forgotten. The helpless­
ness of the single individual who seeks to improve 
a system has settled into hopelessness. The wisdom 
in each officer’s experience has been buried with 
him. Only an institution perpetual but always 
changing in its individual elements, in whic|t by 
conference and discussion a concensus of matured
15lbid.. 128-129, citing address at the dedication of 
the Army WarGollege, Washington, B.C., 9 November 1908,
opinioa can be reached, can perpetmte the résulta 
of lodiTlduAl effort, secure continuity of military 
policy, and command for its aut^orlied, conclusive 
expression of military judgment upon military ques­
tions the respect and effectiveness to Wiich that 
judgment is entitled.
I am sure that I apeak truly %dien I say that 
Presidents and Congresses and Secretaries of War 
Invariably desire such aid in the performance of 
their duties, and for this I look with hope and con­
fidence to the General Staff of the irmy and its 
great adjunctj^̂ the War College, which we are now
establishing.
This hope of the father of the Army General Staff 
for Ismediately salutary results seem perhaps a little pre­
mature, since the staff was not completely shaken down into 
an effective management instrument until the regime of 
Pershing after World War I. Staff modernisation is, of 
Course, a continuing evolutionary process. The power of the 
nearly autonomous bureaus and services of the Army resisted 
incursions and control by the General Staff for many years. 
For those unification addicts who expected that a law today 
would have already proved itself completely effective yes­
terday, it might have been more reassuring if they had realiz­
ed that not the least of the problems of the Departments of 
Defense and Army, even now, is to curb the intransigence of 
the Corps of Engineers in resisting Army, or other, control 
of its civil works. There, due to the tender nursing care 
of a pork-eager Congress, the Chief of Engineers rules
^%bid.. 126, citing address at the laying of the 
cornerstone of the Army War College, 21 February 1903.
^^The beat account is Otto L. Nelson, dr.. National
-X33-
güprem#* allegedly training, but to a considerable degree 
also diverting, his Corps from its prime mission of military
engineering. Even the baleful glare of the Hoover Commission 
has not cured this festering sore, among many Root started 
to cure a half-century before.
Time, however, at the half-century, fifty years 
after loot’s greeting at the General Staff debut, was more 
at a premium, and for this reason, if for no other, violently 
disturbing cataclysms of the military establish^nt should 
have been avoided, even when theoretically more perfect 
organisationally. As Forrestal rightfully contended, work­
ability was the watchword, with specialists operating in 
their own element, as much as possible, instead of arbitrarily 
subjecting themselves to the false omnipotence of ignorant 
jacks of all trades.
Examination of the application of Forrestal* s con­
cept for top level management facilities and staff guidance 
at the stmmit of governmental power, comparable to the 
British or Canadian defense cabinets, is futile on two counts, 
considering the Aamrldan environment to which it was applied. 
First, an incompetent President could not be converted from 
a sow*8 ear to a silk purse solely by a cape of ermine, and 
second, the diffusion of real political power in the United 
States can only cause us to moan, with Kennan, as he surveyed 
the ruins of the MacArthur debacle of 1951# that;
• « • we still have with us, In Wkat Is obviously
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a very acute form, the problem of the machinery 
for decision-aaking and for the Implementation of 
policy In our government. Whatever else may be 
said about these facilities to date, It can hardly 
be said that they are distinguished by such things 
am privacy, deliberateness, or the long-tera ap­
proach. The difficulties we encounter here are so 
plain to all of you at this moment that I shall not 
attempt to adumbrate them. The subject of their 
correction Is an extremely complex one, involving 
many facets of governmental organization and method. 
There are those who feel that these difficulties 
can be satisfactorily disposed of within our present 
constitutional framework and that they are simply a 
question of proper personal leadership in government. 
There are others who doubt that the problem is sol­
uble without constitutional reform— reform which 
would give us a parliamentary system more nearly like 
that which exists in England end most other parlia­
mentary countries, a system in which a government 
fails if it loses the confidence of its parliament, 
and in which there is opportunity to consult the 
people on the great issues and at the crucial moments 
and to adjust governmental responsibilities in ac­
cordance with the people* s decision.
I must say that if I had any doubts before as to 
whether it is this that our ooumtry requires, those 
doubts have been pretty well resolved in my mind by 
the events of the past weeks and months. I find it 
hard to see how we can live up to our responsibili­
ties as a great power unless we are able to resolve, 
in a manner better than we have done recently, the 
great challenges to the soundness of governmental 
policy and to the claim of an administration to * 
speak for the mass of the people in foreign affairs,1®
Obviously, Kennan* s audience at the University of Chicago in
the spring of 1951 was more receptive to and informed by
these remarks than the recently returned resident of the
Waldorf Towers and his helpers from Rapid)lican ranks, who,
for selfish political gain, had been endangering the vitals
of the Ration %d.th misguided criticism of Korean military
operations and other Par East policy.
l^Kennan, 94-95•
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Evea mere dasgereue %o the Nation than MaeÂrthur was 
hi# mentor In political opportimiam, hi# former Commander In 
Chief; Hoover, who, aided by aatelllte# like Taber, Taft, 
Malone, and Martin, held primary responalblllty for verifying, 
within the context of collective guilt, the post-Vorld War II 
shibboleth of false economy in defense. Without a sufficiency 
of the vital military tools of policy, even the beat of top 
management at the summit in American foreign and military af­
fairs would have failed in more effectively stablixing the 
position of the United States, the West, and the »mrld after 
1945. Had it not been for this insistence that the Nation 
was economically unable to provide the necessary means for 
defense beyoM the fifteen billion dollar annual defense cri­
terion inadvertently established by the President, but indel­
ibly stamped by the Eightieth Congress and the Hoover Com­
mission, the validity of the orignal naval concept of uni­
fication and strategy would not have been debased in 1949 by 
the tragic groveling of a Navy begging crumbs from the Con­
gressional banquet table at the expense of her comrades in 
arms from the other armed forces.
The spectacle of a Nation with at least three times 
the productive capacity of the Soviet Union and her satellites 
being outbuilt militarily was rather difficult to extenuate 
on economic grounds. The only actual answer was the American 
inability to sacrifice the habits of slothful ease and mechani­
cal materialism, which have become too much a way of American
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llfe when they cloud the awareness of reality required to 
place these habits in their proper perspective. Here again 
is the return to the thesis of collective guilt. Schwartz 
placed this guilt in realistic focus by citing it as a 
necessary factor for comparing Soviet and American economic 
power. In 1947, Schwartz warned:
Balancing strength and weakness, it semas likely 
that the Soviet Hnion is economically stronger today 
than ever before in its history, having available 
more developed internal resources, as well as the 
wealth of much of Europe idiich lies in its sphere 
of influence. Power is relative, of course, and in 
the next decade or so the Soviet Union, economically, 
will be weaker than the United States. Here again, 
hmfsver, the extent of this weakness should not be 
overestimated. To measure the relative strength of 
both countries, it is inadequate to compare such 
crude indices as production of particular commodi­
ties. If the United States produces four or five 
times as much steel as the USSR, this does not mean 
that it is four or five times as strong. Much of 
American production consists of consumer goods, from 
automobiles and motorboats to golf clubs. Also much 
of American production goes into maintenance and 
repair of our vast productive plant and our great 
stock of conammer durable goods. When these factors 
are taken into accotmt it may be realized that the 
American economic superiority is narrower than sug­
gested by crude production comparisons alone, though 
that superiority is substantial. In the years to 
come, this mar^n of superiority will probably nar­
row. 19
Unfortunately, golf clubs are not a dual purpose weapon for 
both the jousts of peace and war.
Perhaps the curtain of the Nation’s collective guilt, 
a wishful desire for normalcy and strength without sacrifice, 
has already east enough of a concealing shadow over the more 
complex implications of the naval position on unification
19Harry Schwarts, Russia* s IStiSiX. 112-113.
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amd strategy. Ultimata respomslWLlity, even among the mill- 
tazy of a demoeraey, will probably eontinue to be clouded by 
this factor, which makes both the credit a M  blame for action 
and inaction difficult to analyze, assign, and award.
mval right lo Valhalla, In conclusion, however, 
there is only one choice. The criteria of physical coercion 
in the modem world, previously established, make balanced 
forces mandatory if the delicate nuances of military power 
appropriate to varying situations are to be applied. Only 
these balanced forces provide any hope for a maximum of 
stability in the affairs of the United States, the West, and 
the world, before, during, and after the need for physical 
coercion exists. The Havy, and the Kavy alone, among the 
diverse military, economic, and political elements that make 
up the total power of the Nation, insisted on all these shades 
of force in being as essential to defense in the period be­
tween World War II and the Korean incident. The lustre of 
the naval position was ohly sli^tly diœaed in 1949 by the 
depreciation of strategic air power in favor of lesser shades 
of force. After all, only these lesser shades of force had 
been required before the Korean War, and even in 1952, the 
atomic, biological, and chemical air offensive remains, as 
yet, an unused, but necessary, weapon for either potential 
blackmail or reprisal as a deterrent to blackmail and un­
controlled total aggression. The Nation owes a debt of 
gratitude to the Navy for emphasis on balanced forces,
"13$*
tailor-mad® for maximum adaptability to any given military 
situation by quickly merging proper increments of power.
Korea has also pointed the way in support of the naval posi­
tion. The unanswered and dubious question is whether the 
Ration will follow. Until more evidence is in, the answer 
to this question is probably "No." However, the Kavy could 
be right and the Ration wrong, so perhaps the Navy can yet 
join Bernard Baruch on his pedestal, purportedly glorified 
by Germanic praise after World War I, where, in exclusive 
Valhalla, members can point to each other in mutual admira­
tion, saying, "You too know war."
Whether mortal observers will long view the denial 
of reason, which both makes wars possible and their waging 
Increasingly less amenable to restraint in delicately limit­
ing objectives short of the crudest atomic obliteration, also 
is an open question, perhaps to be answered shortly. For 
those nho find the grim suspense unpalatable and the tragic 
errors of the United States and the West unbearable, a fate­
ful and welcome relief is provided by considering the painful 
mistakes of the last, which may yet save the Nation not only 
from the machinations of the Kremlin, but from its own fat­
ness and folly as well. On this auspicious omen, wishfully 
presented in dune 1952, the curtain of another election year 
falls temporarily over this sombre and melancholy scene, re­
vealed in all its essentials by the position of the United 
States Navy on unification and strategy between World War II 
and Korea.
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A fertile field indeed exists for future researchers 
who might at some later and more auspicious date atten^t 
definitive histories or biographies concerning the cause and 
effect of detailed actions related to the post-World War II 
unification and strategy squabbles. Certainly, no dearth of 
materials prevails. A complete listing of published govern­
ment documents relating to the subject in hand might easily 
run to twice the length of this study. In addition, unpub­
lished materials, such as those from closed sessions of Con­
gressional committee hearings and the records and minutes 
concealed in the executive departments because of arbitrary 
fiat or legitimate security reasons, will later find the 
light of day. A shudder passes over the novice in contem-
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plating the many cubic feet of bibliographic cataloging 
required*
Meanwhile, many of the written soureee still ingurdah are already overflowing into document storage ware* ouses where they are brutally scrambled by untrained ar* 
chivists* This tragic picture becomes even more bleak when 
one realises that the incinerator is an even more accessible 
and secure device for bureaucratic frustration of the his­
torian. Even if the written record were kept intact, unre* 
corded conferences, telephom calls, and the mystic words, 
"the boss says," have already faded from historical accuracy 
along with the unrecognised deviations of omission and com­
mission flowing from the written and spoken word. The discs 
and tapes of recorded verbal transactions, too sensitive for 
later stenographic transcription, have long since been shaved 
or destroyed, thus granting future mmoirs immunity from the 
consequences of faulty û«mrf and rationalisation*
Political science, a misnamed art, fortunately grants 
more leeway to its writers than history does to historians. 
Possibly because life is short and due to a sense of duty to 
their contemporaries, these political writers do not wait 
until the last scrap of evidence is in, but try to use their 
own best judgment in collecting, collating, analysing, and 
evaluating the best available information at hand that will 
still allow a timely finished product* Such has been the 
case in this study.
Nevertheless, the Congressional references cited 
above are believed to contain the most reliable primary evi­
dence that has, or can be expected to come to light, even 
for the absolute historical record, in weighing the position 
of the Navy on unification and strategy between World War II 
and the Korean incident. In two of these committee hearings, 
particularly, the administrative cloak of darkness was com­
pletely removed as an obstacle to penetration into the 
innermost recesses of Individual thought and organisational 
policy within the Navy Departfwnt. Even those still beholden 
to executive direction were not officially under wraps. What 
little, if any, guessing these witnesses attempted, as to how 
best to fit into the future party line of the naval estab­
lishment, was more than rectified by retired personnel, 
members of civilian reserve components, and other naval en­
thusiasts, all of whom were more than happy to fill any gaps 
in the record through sincere collaboration with the par­
ticular brand of naval thought they espoused. The united 
front displayed was most remarkable. The Senate Military 
Affairs Committee of 1945 and the House Armed Services Com­
mittee of 1949, in the latter phase of the so-called Navy 
Mutiny, successfully provided unchaperoned fcrims for this 
free naval expression. The other hearings on defense organi­
zation from 1946 through 1949 progressively became less 
productive of actuality in reflecting the true rather than 
the officially enforced naval viewpoint. The sad spectacle
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of am #*b*rr*###d Admiral Doofiold reluctantly repeating a
diataiteful Executive policy to the Senate Committee In 1949 
on the fydlaga Bill, While General Gates, Marine Corps Com­
mandant, grumbled unhappily In the background with imaccus- 
tomed leather-neck reserve, provided a marked contrast with 
the testimony that the same Chief of Naval Operations was tofive In unintentional valedictory to the House Committee a ew weeks later during the wide-open arguments on unification 
and strategy. Evidence in the other hearings after 1945 must 
be treated with a more jaundiced eye and Is buttressed in 
this study by personal knowledge and a discriminating use of 
the lonesome and tragic views of a troubled mind, James 
Porrestal*#, whose record has been considerably qualified by 
censorship and editing.
For the moat part, however, all of these hearings 
are naked and unadorned In comparison with the literary and 
personal embellishments, not always conducive to unvarnished 
truth# that the published departmental reports from the Exec­
utive Branch convey during this same period in their treat­
ment of naval views and later defection. Omission of these 
reports has been made, therefore, largely on the grounds of 
lack of credibility or because of duplication of evidence. 
Similarly, House hearings and reports have been omitted,
Wills the Senate carried the ball on defense organisation, 
because of the close collaboration between the respective 
committee chairmen and the duplication of witnesses and evi­
dence. later, in contrast, during the 1949 Mutiny, the House 
Committee stole the limelight due to the intransigent sympa­
thy for the NSvy by some irresponsible House whbers, largely 
of Republican extraction. Also, during this period, the 
Senate Committee was wrapped up in the Tydings changes of 
the defense organisation, while fydings, himself, as chair­
man of the coa^ttee, was more than happy to pass the respon­
sibility for this investigation to the House in order to 
devote more time to his vain effort to survive politically 
under McCarthyism.
The last item in this section, Watson’s Chief of
#lthou*^r%ecEnIcally
a j^vernment publication, is nevertheless a splendid defini­
tive history of the command post of the irmy, with emphasis 
on the Chief of Staff’s role of cooperation with the Navy and 
State Departments, and also relates his duties as a princi­
pal military adviser to the President and Congress during 
the period between the first two World Wars. As a history, 
internally prepared in the Pentagon, it has the advantage of 
impressive documentation, fairly used, if the chips falling 
without favor from President to office help are any indica­
tion. Ho one is spared, even the grand *01d Man,” Marshall 
himself, nor should they be as this book accomplishes its 
objective of making the pre-World War II record clear for all 
to see. The SaVy’s rightful and predominant position before 
World War II is unequivocally conceded throughout the text.
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Gomlng fro® an outside source, this book provides an un­
biased insight of the Havy»s superior experience and train­
ing over many years in defense leadership.
2, MBW3PAPSR3 AND P&aiODIOAL ARTICLB9
Armv-Naw-Air Force Journal (Washington). Formerly Army and 
Wavy Journal.
Brown, Harrison, "How Big Heed a Bomb Be?" The American 
Scholar. XII, Summer, 1950.
MllUa
Kansas), IXXI, March 1952.
"Report on the Army of a Neutral Country; Switser- 
ïand," L'Armee la Nation (Belgium), January 1951, digest­
ed by Military It^iew (Command and General Staff College, 
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), XXXI, July 1951.
Root, Ilihu, "A Requisite for Popular Diplomacy," Foreign 
Affaire. I, September 1922.
TMw* fSESÊ preeminentgasette of the armed forces since 1863, has never let its 
readers down in its precise weekly coverage of military and 
foreign affairs with all their executive and legislative 
domestic ramifications. Generally scooping the best dailies, 
including the New York Times, because of its unbiased on-tbe- 
spot coverage tha't grants It precedence on delayed releases, 
and without fear or favor, the Joynal is far superior to the 
Times, impregnated as it is with Hanson Baldwin, D3NA, *24, 
in unemotionally considering the events recorded in this 
study, both in news items and editorially. However, only 
news items have been used here to review recent and as yet 
unpublished Congressional hearings, to capture some flavor 
of the hectic events of 1949 and 1950, and to substitute for 
a published House Committee Report, not distributed to this 
location, which the Journal quoted in full,
A debt of gratitude is owed to the periodicals cited, 
which along with others over the years may have contributed 
to the opinions expressed in this study, but, as in the case 
of remittances to Webster, all debts cannot be paid. The 
specific articles are cited only as they came in hand through 
recollection or emerged later in the afterlight as partiql 
support of previously held views. These views, it is to be 
hoped, have not unduly preconditioned honest expression of 
fact and opinion.
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3. BIOGRAPHIES, MEMOIRS, AND WRITIHGS OP PUBLIC MEH
Churehill, Winston S., the Soeond World War. I-V, Houghton 
Mifflin Company, Boston, 1948— .
Jessup, Philip C., Elihu Root. 2 vols., Dodd, Mead, and 
Company, Sew York, l9io.
Kennan, George P., American ligloj^ci 1222-Ü5â» University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951.
Millis, Walter, ed., and £« S. Duffield, collaborator, The 
Porrestal Diaries. Viking Press, Hew York, 1951.
Root, Blihu, m i M p  aaâ S R i a a W  &he unitedStates. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott, eds., Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1916,
Here, both for authors and subjects, words alone can­
not express proper affection and respect for the sublime.
The conflict between Root and his youthful Boswell only 
deepens devotion to both. By now, Jessup, in spite of 
McCarthy to the contrary, is well on the way to upxoot Root. 
Both of these men are products of their times, but no appar­
ent irrevocable cleavage between them exists in the means 
they have devoted to the national interest. Jessup’s biog­
raphy of Root was indispensable in evaluating Root’s selected 
papers and addresses so thou^tfully prepared as a campaign 
document for him in 1916 by Bacon and Scott. The remaining 
material in this section passes the critical tests of both 
fore and hindsi#t and, except for the qualification on 
Porrestal cited in section 1 of this Bibliography, should 
be accepted as authoritative in the fields of fact and opin­
ion.
4. SPECIAL MONOGRAPHS
Husar, Ellas, The Purse and the Sword. Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, ilvfT, 1^507”*
Nelson. Otto L., iationa|.. g$curity and General Staff, 
Infantry Journal Press, Washington, D.C., 1946.
Schwara, Harry, Russia’a ffistwar Economy. Syracuse Univer­
sity Press, Syracuse, N.I., 1947.
Nelson is a rather unique character in that he carried 
more people on his shoulders than any other junior army 
officer in the last mr and did iiànsuch a likable self-effac-
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lag way that his merit was reeognlseâ by four Distinguished 
Servie* Medals and promotions from Captain to Major General 
in four years. Renowned as the foremost management expert 
of the Army, in spite of the kudos falling deservedly on 
capable four-star McHamey, his boss, lelson at the age of 
forty-four resigned his commission in 1946, overpaid his 
debt to the Ration by bringing his Harvard doctoral disserta­
tion up to date in the book cited above, and is now making 
quite a comfortable living as Vice President of the New York 
Life Insurance Company# He risked the rigors of civilian 
life anwd only wità a Major’s retirement pay, but, in less 
than two years, fluidity in retirement laws jimped him again 
to the grade of Major General without the onus of remounting 
the promotion ladder rung by rung. Unfortunately^ his book, 
after laboriously following Root’s General Staff concept 
through over forty years of painfhl trial and error for the 
Army, jumps to the conclusion that an identical system can 
be raœaed down the Nation’s throat overnight as a means of 
integrating all the armed forces. The book in its entirety, 
however, is the strongest possible supporting evidence for 
the Navy’s recomaendations on evolutionary development in 
defense organisation.
Husar demonstrates considerable knowledge of the 
relations of the armed forces and the Bureau of the Budget 
with Congress* Also, his book provides useful background 
material for judiciously analysing the motivations of Con­
gressmen, who, from the nature of the electoral process, 
place constituents, district, state, and perhaps party, es­
pecially if in a minority, above the needs of the Nation. 
Despite numerous examples confirming this thesis, Husar fails 
to recognise this basic premise and aim ignores the funda­
mental Constitutional defect of authority ^thout responsibil­
ity given to Congress while the Executive suffers responsi­
bility without authority, a fundamental management defect 
that only a parliamentary system can cure. Nevertheless, 
this scholarly piece of work by a former Bureau of the Budget 
employee, dwelling in his iVory tower at Cornell, shows 
sublime <H»nfidence that the Bureau of the Budget and Congress 
are perfectly capable of running the defences of the Nation 
without adequate professional advice. One reviewer intimates 
that his chortle of joy over the hamstringing of Tommy Atkins, 
Davey Jones, and the wild-blue-yonder boys changed to a 
death-rattle, possibly induced by the shock of Korea. Husar*s 
dubious nugget was suggested as a reference by the Director 
of the Budget. The book proved a poor consolation prize in 
return for valiant, but fruitless, efforts to penetrate the 
curtain still hanging over the documented Executive portion 
of the melancholy scene herewith described.
Sehwars provides an early and realistic estimate of 
Soviet recovery potential from the aftermath of war. De­
scribed somewhat vaguely as a post-doctoral fellowship 
project, his independent study of the few open Soviet sources
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available gala* statura by coming to the same ooncluaion# as 
the Army General Staff did during the same period with the 
aid of British covert sources. Only one obvious finding is 
considered indisputable, namely, that golf clubs, yearly 
Cadillacs, and other conspicuous civilian consumption, wimn 
subtracted from fantastic American production indices rela­
tive to those of the Soviet orbit, reduce the apparent 
superior economic power of the Bnited States as a usable 
instrument of policy in terms of immediate military effec­
tiveness.
